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The Economics of Distinctiveness:  The Road 
to Monopolization in Trade Mark Law 
P. SEAN MORRIS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The debate on trade mark use1 would not be complete without a 
foray into the economics of distinctiveness in trade marks. Trade mark 
use is governed by statute in many jurisdictions, at the national level, 
and also by international treaties.2 The protection of trade marks under 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) can be found in 
 
* Emil Aaltonen Research Fellow, University of Helsinki. Part of this paper was presented at the 
conference, Global IP and New Interfaces, Helsinki, Finland, April 16–17, 2010, and was 
originally titled, The Law and Economics of Trademarks:  Product Differentiation, Market Power 
and New Directions in Antitrust. The author is grateful to the participants especially Annette Kur, 
Max-Oker Blom, Onsgar Ohly and Katja Weckstrom for useful comments. The author is also 
grateful to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Review for their assistance with publishing this article. 
 1. In recent years, an insightful debate among some of the more eminent contemporary 
trademark scholars occurred over the existence and scope of the trademark use requirement. See, 
e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademark and Consumer Search Costs on the 
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004); see also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding 
Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1670 (2007); Uli Widmaier, 
Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 604 (2004); 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use:  Contextualism in Trademark Law, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2007); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons 
from the Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703 (2007); Mark P. McKenna, Trademark 
Use and the Problem of Sources in Trademark Law, 101 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 773–75 (2009); see 
generally Margreth Barrett, Finding Trademark Use:  The Historical Foundation for Limiting 
Infringement Liability to Uses “In the Manner of a Mark”, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893 (2009) 
(discussing the existence and scope of the use requirement in light of common law and the 
Lanham Act). 
 2. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as 
Revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900, and Washington on June 2, 1911, at the Hague on 
November 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm 
on July 14, 1967, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
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Articles 15–21.3 Under Article 15(1) of TRIPS, distinctiveness 
reverberates as the sole substantive condition for the protection of a 
trade mark.4 TRIPS provisions on trade marks can be found in the 
national trade mark laws of many Member States of the WTO or 
TRIPS-plus5 preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which adopt a 
higher standard of protection of intellectual property rights than that 
offered by TRIPS.6 The definition of trade marks under TRIPS is 
similarly echoed in the European Union (EU), where applications can 
be made for a Community trade mark (CTM).7 Under Article 4 of 
Regulation No. 40/94, the Community Trade Mark Regulation (CTMR), 
[a] Community trade mark may consist of any signs capable of being 
represented graphically, particularly words, including personal 
names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their 
packaging, provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the 
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings.8 
The consistent definition of a trade mark both in international, 
regional, and national statutes tells us that trade marks are the same, 
irrespective of geographic boundaries. In the Lanham Act, where 
Section 1127 provides definitions, the term ‘mark’ includes any trade 
 
 3. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 15–21. 
 4. Article 15(1) of TRIPS describes trademarks as 
[a]ny sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or 
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall be capable of 
constituting a trademark. Such signs, in particular words including personal 
names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of colours as well 
as any combination of such signs, shall be eligible for registration as trademarks. 
Where signs are not inherently capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or 
services. Members may make registrability depend on distinctiveness acquired 
through use. Members may require, as a condition of registration, that signs be 
visually perceptible.  
For a comparative discussion on trademarks under TRIPS and other international agreements, see 
generally Joanna Schmidt-Szalewski, The International Protection of Trademarks after the TRIPS 
Agreement, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 189 (1998); NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS 
REGIME OF TRADEMARKS AND DESIGNS 99–262 (2d ed. 2011) (examining  the new rules  of 
trademark protection under TRIPS as compared to the Paris Convention). 
 5. For recent discussion on TRIPS-plus, see generally Beatrice Lindstrom, Note, Scaling 
Back TRIPS-Plus:  An Analysis of Intellectual Property Provisions in Trade Agreements and 
Implications for Asia and the Pacific, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 917 (2010) (examining 
TRIPS-plus preferential trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region). 
 6. Id. at 927. 
 7. Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1; amended 
and replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 207/2009 of 26 February 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1 
[hereinafter CTMR]. 
 8.  Id. art. 4. 
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mark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark, while the 
term ‘trade mark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof (1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a 
bona fide intention to use in commerce.9 Thus, a trade mark, according 
to the Lanham Act, is used by a person in commerce to “identify and 
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, 
even if that source is unknown.”10 
Another key word in the definition section of the Lanham Act, 
which is inextricably linked to trade marks, is the word ‘commerce.’ 
The definition of commerce includes “all commerce which may 
lawfully be regulated by Congress.”11 Arguably, the best interpretation 
of the Lanham Act, similar to TRIPS and the CTMR12 mentioned 
above, is that it guarantees trade mark rights. Though the debate on 
trade mark use focuses on the Lanham Act, which does not explicitly 
mention trade mark use,13 the arguments in this article focus on the 
doctrinal distinctiveness of trade marks, especially as developed in the 
EU. 
 
 9. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) 15 U.S.C. § 1127 [2004] 
[hereinafter Lanham Act]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. Lanham Act, section 1127 explains that the term “use in commerce” means: 
[T]he bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made 
merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be 
deemed to be in use in commerce— (1) on goods when— (A) it is placed in any 
manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on 
the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such 
replacement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their 
sale, and (b) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and (2) on services 
when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services 
are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or 
in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is 
engaged in commerce in connection with the services. 
 12. See CTMR, supra note 7. 
 13. See the discussions in Dogan and Lemley, supra note 1, at 1672, and Dinwoodie and 
Janis, supra note 1, at 1609–18, on the varied interpretations of trade mark use in the Lanham 
Act. See also Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006), which 
states that  
[s]ubject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is 
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an 
injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has 
become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is 
likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, 
regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of 
competition, or of actual economic injury. 
  
324 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 33:321 
The legal regime for trade mark law in the EU is covered by the 
harmonizing Trade Marks Directive14 and the CTMR.15 According to its 
provisions, the Trade Marks Directive itself is not necessarily intended 
to harmonize the trade mark laws of Member States in every aspect, but 
rather just “those national provisions of law which most directly affect 
the functioning of the internal market.”16 In Levi Strauss & Co. v. 
Casucci SpA, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ)17 said 
that “the purpose of [the Trade Mark Directive] is generally to strike a 
balance between the interest of the proprietor of a trade mark to 
safeguard its essential function, on the one hand, and the interests of 
other economic operators in having signs capable of denoting their 
products and services.”18 
Here, it is possible to draw a direct comparison between the 
“interests of economic operators” and those of monopolies. Regardless 
of whether such a comparison affects the normal operating functions of 
trade marks, the fundamental question that remains is whether the 
distinctiveness of trade marks is one of the root causes of 
monopolization in trade mark law. 
This article hypothesizes that distinctiveness in trade mark law is a 
source of monopolization, and consequently, the lens of antitrust law 
should focus on whether the distinctiveness requirement is relevant in 
modern trade mark use. 
Part II of this article begins with a discussion of trade marks and 
monopolies, establishing the framework for the rest of the article. Part II 
also addresses the role of market power in trade marks within the 
framework of antitrust law and suggests that the market power held by 
trade marks presents problems for antitrust law. 
 
 14. See Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2008 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, O.J. (L 299) 25.  
 15. See CTMR, supra note 7.  
 16. Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, at 25.  
 17. The Treaty of Lisbon changed the name of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities to the Court of Justice of the European Union. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 
2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, art 1(20)(1) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. The former Court of First 
Instance was renamed the General Court and the supreme body is now called the Court of Justice 
(ECJ). See id. In EU Law, the term Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) refers to the 
two levels of jurisdiction taken together. See id; see also id. art. 1(2)(b) (“The Union shall be 
founded on the present Treaty and on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union . . . 
Those two Treaties shall have the same legal value. The Union shall replace and succeed the 
European Community.”). 
 18. Case C-145/05, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Casucci SpA, 2006 E.C.R. I-3717, ¶ 29. 
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Part III offers a thorough discussion on the literature of the law and 
economics of trade marks. This literature on the law and economics of 
trade marks establishes the role trade marks play in the economic 
activity of modern society and their commercial magnetism. 
Part IV examines the main claim of the article, that the economics 
of distinctiveness leads to monopolization. The section analyzes cases 
before the ECJ and highlights the point of departure in how the court 
treats distinctiveness. 
Part V further develops the antitrust arguments briefly introduced 
in Part II, and argues that trade marks’ exclusive rights preserve 
monopoly rights in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (formerly Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty).19 
Part VI then gives an analysis of the arguments in the previous 
sections. Part VII concludes the article, asserting that distinctiveness is 
key to transforming trade marks into monopolies. 
II.  MONOPOLIES AND TRADE MARKS 
The argument that trade mark rights are monopolistic is not new. 
What distinguishes the arguments in this article from others previously 
made, however, is their focus on the need for both a new direction in 
trade mark rights and the interpretation of such rights in the antitrust 
jurisprudence of the ECJ.20 Although the majority of the ECJ’s cases 
involve trade mark infringement, the Court only occasionally 
acknowledges the monopoly aspect of trade marks. Even then, however, 
the ECJ forgoes any concrete discussion of trade marks and the effects 
of monopolies on competition law. For example, in Libertel Groep BV 
v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, the ECJ held that an “extensive monopoly 
[of trade marks] would be incompatible with a system of undistorted 
competition, in particular because it could have the effect of creating an 
 
 19. On December 1, 2009, the Lisbon Treaty renamed the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (TEC), otherwise knows as the Rome Treaty, as the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 17; see also Consolidated Versions of 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 3, 
2010, O.J. (C 83) [hereinafter TFEU]. Several articles, including the antitrust provisions, were 
renumbered, and former Articles 81 and 82 of the TEC are now Articles 101 and 102 respectively 
of the TFEU. See id. This article will use one or the other throughout, where appropriate. 
 20. In this article, the focus is on Article 102 of the TFEU and the case law of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ); relevant citations to the antitrust principles of Article 101 will also be 
made, however. For similar arguments, see Charles R. Mandly, Jr., Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty 
and Trademark Rights, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1314, 1320 (2003) (arguing that “[u]nlike other 
intellectual property rights, trademarks may be perpetual, potentially lasting as long as does the 
underlying goodwill.”). 
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unjustified competitive advantage for a single trader.”21 This is not the 
first time courts have associated trade marks with monopolies.22 
Previous decisions in the United Kingdom (U.K.), the United States, 
and other parts of Europe have made similar pronouncements.23 Those 
courts, however, have failed to articulate the argument that trade marks 
may constitute monopolies and, as such, may be a source of concern in 
the context of antitrust law. 
Cases that involve antitrust infringement both in Europe and the 
rest of the world involve claims of anticompetitive practices by 
dominant firms using market power or monopoly power.24 The 
European Commission’s Notice on the Definition of the Relevant 
Market (Relevant Market Notice) provided guidance on the possibility 
of preventing the exercise of market power.25 The Relevant Market 
Notice pointed to the relevant product market and geographic market 
when determining the impact of an undertaking on competition law, 
which comes about when “[a] relevant product market comprises all 
those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or 
substitutable by the consumer.”26 
The geographic market is a geographic area in which the market 
power of an undertaking must be operating. The Relevant Market 
Notice defines the relevant geographic market as comprising 
the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the 
supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions 
of competition are sufficiently homogenous and which can be 
distinguished from neighboring areas because the conditions of 
competition are appreciably different in those area [sic].27 
The above provision suggests a degree of flexibility in interpreting the 
relevant market in specific sectors and the determination of the relevant 
market in intellectual property cases; competition, however, will 
influence how such cases will be decided. 
 
 21. Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, 2003 E.C.R. I-3822, ¶ 54. 
 22. See Harold R. Weinberg, Is the Monopoly Theory of Trademarks Robust or a Bust?, 13 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 137, 142 (2005). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust Standard on 
Building in Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 76 
ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 483–84 (2009). 
 25. See Commission Notice 97/3, 1997 O.J. (372) 1, ¶ 1 (EU) (stating “The purpose of this 
notice is to provide guidance as to how the Commission applies the concept of relevant product 
and geographic market in its ongoing enforcement of Community competition law.”). 
 26. Id. ¶ 7. 
 27. Id. ¶ 8. 
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Where intellectual property owners are differentiating their 
products, they will tend to prevent the entry into the market of similar 
products and embrace a monopolist nature, which could distort 
competition. As James Keyte observed, “product differentiation and 
indirect competition are encompassed within the concept of 
‘monopolistic competition’ developed in the 1930s.” 28 For example, 
Keyte clarifies Joan Robinson’s and Edward Chamberlin’s explanation 
that “significant differentiation made every producer a ‘monopolist’ 
over its own product to the extent it faced a downward-sloping demand 
curve.”29 The same argument can be used when discussing products that 
are the subject of intellectual property rights and trade marks in 
particular. As Keyte argued, “product differentiation itself indicates the 
existence of some degree of market power since it gives the producer 
the ability to price above cost.”30 This article will further expand upon 
the arguments surrounding product differentiation in Part VI below. 
A.  Economic Definition of Monopoly 
In order to get a firm grasp of the concept of monopolies, one must 
examine how economic theorists have discussed the concept. The 
standard textbooks on microeconomics tell us that a monopoly is a 
single seller of a product for which there is no close substitute, and that 
market power is the ability of the monopolist to charge a price above 
marginal cost and earn a positive profit.31 For instance, one of the more 
popular textbooks in European schools of economics, authored by Hal 
Varian, explains that when there is only one firm in the market, that 
firm is unlikely to take the market price as given.32 Instead, a 
“monopoly would recognize its influence over the market price and 
choose that level of price and output that maximized its overall 
profits.”33 The definition of monopoly in industrial organization (a sub-
branch of microeconomics) literature similarly defines monopoly as a 
 
 28. James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated Products:  The Need for a 
Workable Standard, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 697, 701 (1995).  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 698.  
 31. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS:  A MODERN APPROACH 423 (7th 
ed. 2006). 
 32. Id. at 423–24. 
 33. Id.; see also ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 409 (6th ed. 2006) 
(stating that “[a] monopoly is a market structure in which a single seller of a product with no 
close substitutes serves the entire market”). 
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single seller facing competitive consumers in one or several markets.34 
As such the monopoly can determine either the price of the product or 
the quantity supplied.35 
Monopoly pricing can be divided into two distinct categories:  a 
single product monopoly and a multi-product monopoly.36 In the 
former, a monopolist sells only one good and, as such, represents a 
model of imperfect competition.37 In the latter, on the other hand, the 
“demand and cost of one product do not affect demand and cost for 
other products.”38 
The definition of monopoly is essential to identifying the issue and 
arguments in this article, especially the relationship between 
competition (or antitrust policy) and intellectual property, specifically 
trade marks. Since a monopoly encompasses a markedly different form 
of market structure, as compared to perfect competition, monopolies can 
dominate the market. Perfect competition and monopolies are two 
market structures at opposite ends of the competitive spectrum. In 
contrast to perfect competition, monopolies involve barriers to market 
entry, long-run abnormal profits, and differentiated products.39 As a 
result, monopolists can abuse their market power by restricting output 
and forcing price increases on the customer.40 In this regard, as Robert 
Frank explains, the key feature that differentiates the monopoly from 
the competitive firm, is the price elasticity of the demand facing the 
firm.41 
 
 34. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 1.4(b) (2d ed. 1999). 
 35. OZ SHY, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION:  THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 71–72 (1995); see 
also WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1 (3d ed. 1990). 
 36. MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 533 (2004). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 535. 
 39. The concept of perfect competition is based on a large range of assumptions, however. 
The assumptions frequently applicable are:  (1) the firm is a price taker (every firm in the market 
is so small relative to the market that it cannot exert any perceptible influence on price); (2) the 
product is homogenous (in the eyes of the consumer, the product of one seller is identical to that 
of another seller); (3) there is freedom of entry and exit; (4) free mobility of resources; and (5) the 
participants in the market have perfect knowledge (consumers know prices, producers know 
costs, etc.). See also G.S. MADDALA & ELLEN MILLER, MICROECONOMICS:  THEORY AND 
APPLICATIONS 283 (1989) (explaining that in a market characterized by perfect competition, no 
individual buyer or seller influences the price by his or her purchases or sales). 
 40. See  FRANK, supra note 33, at 409; Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and 
Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 245 (1987) (“When economists use the terms 
’market power’ or ‘monopoly power’, they usually mean the ability to price at a supracompetitive 
level.”). See also “Market Power”, Economics:  A-Z, THE ECONOMIST, http://www.economist. 
com/economics-a-to-z/m#node-21529856 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
 41. See  FRANK, supra note 33, at 409. 
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In relation to intellectual property rights, monopolies held by 
individuals or organizations may begin by the granting of a patent or 
copyright, by the possession of a superior skill or talent, or by the 
ownership of strategic capital. Thus, the monopolist establishes a 
market position through the ability to control absolutely the supply of a 
product or service offered for sale and the related ability to set the 
price.42 
However, another area of intellectual property rights that is often 
ignored when it comes to applying the theory of monopoly, is trade 
marks. While monopoly power is normally associated with government 
franchise agreements or with businesses that operate privately and 
amass significant market power,43 the connection between monopolies 
and trade mark protection does not get the same amount of scrutiny. The 
degree of monopoly, especially as the discussion on economic literature 
in Part III below will show, is crucial to further understanding antitrust 
law and its relationship to intellectual property rights, particularly trade 
marks. 
To this end, market power, which is a crucial aspect of the 
economics of competition law, is also significant to how we 
conceptualize and understand the economic effect of trade marks. In this 
respect, and also from what we have gleaned from the economic theory 
of monopoly, the behavior of monopolists must then be put under the 
microscope. From a legal perspective, such microscopic examination 
can only be done through the legal provisions that regulate or prohibit 
abuse of a dominant position.44 These legal provisions are Article 102 of 
the TFEU45 in the EU and Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act in the 
United States.46 
 
 42. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 672 (Douglas Greenwald ed. 1982). 
 43. See, e.g., Michael D. Blanchard, Regulated Industries—Statutory Construction of 
Section 541(a) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992:  A 
Presumption in Favor of Practical Reason, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 437 (1996) (discussing the 
market power of private cable companies); see also Solveig Singleton, The Patent Prejudice:  
Intellectual Property As Monopoly, PROGRESS ON POINT, Oct. 2006, at 4–5. 
 44. The dominant position referred to in Article 102 of the TFEU relates to a position of 
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking that enables it “to hinder the maintenance of 
effective competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, its customers and, ultimately consumers.” Case T-201/04, 
Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 229; see also Case 27/76, United Brands 
v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207. 
 45. See  TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102. 
 46. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004). 
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B.  Trade Marks:  “One of Those Monopolies”47 
Intellectual property rights protection is not granted out of thin air. 
The granting of intellectual property rights protection is a legal process 
that covers a period of time for the right holder to benefit from the fruits 
of his labor.48 This period of protection varies. For instance, in 
copyrights, the period of protection is the life of the author plus seventy 
years.49 While in patents, the protection generally lasts for twenty 
years.50 In trade marks, however, protection is normally indefinite.51 
What these areas of protection do tell us however is that they are a form 
of legal monopoly resulting from the exclusivity and absoluteness of the 
intellectual property protection. This form of legal monopoly then is 
bound to present problems for antitrust law. One such problem is the 
abuse of a dominant position by the right holder. 
A distinguished legal scholar on intellectual property rights in the 
EU, Guy Tritton, has identified three schools of thought “to considering 
whether the exercise of [intellectual property rights] is or is not an abuse 
of a dominant position.”52 The schools of thought are:  (1) “the exercise 
of [intellectual property rights] can never amount to an abuse;” (2) “the 
grant of a monopoly to an [intellectual property rights] owner is in 
effect a state-granted sanction to exploit the market in the protected 
product to the full extent that the market place can bear;” and, (3) “the 
exercise of [intellectual property rights] by a dominant undertaking 
must be subject to the same controls as the exercise of other types of 
economic power by a dominant undertaking.”53 
Tritton’s schools of thought are somewhat similar to the U.S. 
schools of thought, especially the law and economics perspectives of 
Chicago and Harvard.54 The U.S. schools of thought on law and 
economics have significantly influenced antitrust policy-making in the 
EU and can be considered as one of the great American exports to the 
 
 47. Blanchard v. Hill, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 692, 692–94; 2 Atk. 484, 484–86 (as described 
by Lord Hardwicke in his opinion). 
 48. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 291 
(1988). 
 49. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOCUS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 92 (2006). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. GUY TRITTON ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 996 (3d ed. 2007). 
 53. Id. at 996–97. 
 54. See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act:  How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 691–94 (2010). 
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EU.55 The rules regulating monopoly or attempts at monopolization in 
the EU are strikingly similar to the relevant provisions in the Sherman 
Act.56 For instance, Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states that 
every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, shall be guilty of a felony.57  
Although the European legal counterpart is worded differently, it 
sends the same legal message by providing that  
any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within 
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States.58  
Thus, under the U.S. approach, monopolization contains two 
elements that correspond to dominance and abuse: (1) the possession of 
monopoly power and (2) the willful acquisition of that power.59 In the 
EU, Article 102 of the TFEU does not define dominance per se.60 It 
does require, however, two broad categories of abuse, namely 
exploitative abuse and exclusionary abuse.61 In principle, the other 
categories, such as tying and discrimination, are more or less included 
in these two categories.62 Equating trade marks to monopolies arises 
from the legal protection of trade marks, which “allows an investment in 
quality to be rewarded by repeat purchase and other reputation 
effects.”63 It is this form of reward that generates monopoly power over 
 
 55. See generally id.; EUROPEAN ECON. & MKTG. CONSULTANTS, MODERNISATION 
ARTICLE 102 TFEU 1, available at http://www.ee-mc.com/files/Modernisation%20Article%2010 
2.pdf. 
 56. See Sherman Antitrust Act § 2; TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102. 
 57. Sherman Antitrust Act § 2. 
 58. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102. 
 59. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).  A 2005 U.S. Congres-
sional Report distinguished monopoly and monopolization as separate concepts by analysing the 
statements of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission on merger enforcement and some government actions against Microsoft and Intel 
Corporations. See H. Rpt. 109-541, Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006. 
 60. See ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW:  TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 262 (4th ed. 2010); TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102. 
 61. See JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 60, at 269. 
 62. Id. at 271 (describing price discrimination as exploitative abuse), 277 (suggesting that 
tying is an exclusionary abuse). 
 63. Pierre Régibeau & Katharine Rockett, The Relationship Between Intellectual Property 
Law and Competition Law:  An Economic Approach, in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY 505, 520 (Steven D. Anderman 
ed., 2007). 
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the distinctive trade mark in the sense that others can be excluded from 
using the same or a confusingly similar trade mark.64 
Perhaps the earliest signal that trade mark protection constitutes a 
monopoly was the 1742 judgment in Blanchard v. Hill.65 There, Lord 
Hardwicke referred to a trade mark charter as “one of those 
monopolies.”66 Since this landmark ruling, equating trade marks to 
monopolies has been a roller coaster ride in the courts on both sides of 
the Atlantic.67 In addition, the discussion on the monopolistic nature of 
trade mark protection has been even more prevalent in scholarly debate.  
III.   THE LITERATURE ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF TRADE MARKS 
In contemporary times, where trade mark rights encourage more 
economic activities, law and economics68 approaches to trade mark are 
somewhat under-theorized, as explained by Graeme Dinwoodie.69 One 
reason for the under-theorizing of trade mark law may well be that the 
simplicity of trade marks does not warrant much of an intellectual 
inquiry. In other words, trade marks are just signs70 and symbols that 
signify a brand71 or quality.72 
 
 64. See also id. at 505–52. 
 65. Blanchard, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep, supra note 47, at 692–93 (2 ATK 484–85). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Monopoly Rights and Registered Trademarks—Sample Registered Trademark 
Cases, BATTLE FOR TRADEMARKS, http://www.battle.ie/monopoly.html (last visited Jan. 29, 
2012); Weinberg, supra note 22, at 141–45. 
 68. At this stage, the reader should note that this article will not be mathematically oriented, 
but rather explanatory. The reader should also note that the terms ‘competition’ and ‘antitrust’ are 
used interchangeably and should not alter the linguistic tone of this article. Secondly, ‘firms’ or 
‘manufacturers’ are also used interchangeably. Thirdly, ‘market power’ and ‘monopoly power’ 
are one and the same for the purposes of this paper. For similar discussion to the latter, see 
generally Krattenmaker et al., supra note 40 (arguing that attempting to distinguish between 
‘market power’ and ‘monopoly power’ creates a false dichotomy). See also DENNIS W. CARLTON 
& JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 97–98 (1989) (explaining that 
monopoly power and market power are used interchangeably in their book to mean “the ability to 
profitably set price above competitive levels (that is, above marginal cost)”). There, one of the 
more common concepts in microeconomics is introduced for the first time—marginal cost. See id. 
at 98. As such, economists use both ‘market power’ and ‘monopoly power’ to refer to the power 
of a single firm or group of firms to price profitably above marginal cost. See id. 
 69. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademark Law and Social Norms 6 (2007) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review). 
Dinwoodie listed a few notable exceptions such as Landes & Posner and Schechter. Id. at n.18; 
see also Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1949) (explaining the social values behind trademarks). 
 70. Section 1127 of the Lanham Act stipulates that the term “trademark” means: 
 [A]ny word, name or symbol, or device, or any combination thereof— (1) used 
by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce to 
identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, 
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Another explanation may well be that, given the abundance of 
trade marks, it is just natural to register a trade mark when starting a 
business. In this regard, like the common surname, trade marks can be 
explained in a historical context rather than through ‘theoretical 
approaches.’ Dinwoodie’s assertion that the law and economics 
approaches to trade marks are under-theorized does not necessarily 
reflect the true picture, however. As discussed in this section, scholars 
such as Landes & Posner, Barnes, Lemley, and a host of others have 
actually made significant contributions in this area. 
Whatever the explanations for the under-theorizing of trade mark 
law, trade marks are powerful symbols or service marks. They serve as 
carriers of information73 or as company assets and indicators of 
corporate strengths. These roles put trade marks at the very heart of 
society, and thus causes trade marks to have a beneficial effect on 
society. This effect stems from the interaction between variations in 
trade marks and consumers. Trade marks relay information to 
consumers, and therefore are essential to the very existence of 
competition.74 
 
from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that 
source is unknown. 
Lanham Act, supra note 9, § 1127. This latter definition of trademarks in the Lanham Act is 
similar to language that was first used to define trademarks in the first written treatise on 
trademark law: 
A trademark is the name, symbol, figure, letter, form or device, adopted and used, 
by a manufacturer, or merchant, in order to designate the goods that he 
manufacturers, or sells, and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by 
another; to the end that they may be known in the market, as his, and thus enable 
him to secure such profits as result from a reputation for superior skill, industry or 
enterprise. 
FRANCIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS 9 (1860). 
 71. See Lanham Act, supra note 9, § 1127.  This article loosely refers to brand as part of 
trademark protection. Brands are special intangible assets and for most companies are the most 
important asset due to the economic impact that brands have. 
 72. Though this article will not discuss at length the quality functions of trademarks, it has 
long been the favorite of legal academics that began with the writings of the American academic 
Frank I. Schechter’s 1927 article in the Harvard Law Review, cited infra note 76. The courts 
rarely depart from emphasizing the quality function of trademarks and in the Park ‘N Fly 
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that trademarks “foster competition and the maintenance 
of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of a good reputation.” Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. 
Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). 
 73. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 
621, 645–46 (outlining some of the theoretical intricacies of the relationship between a mark, a 
marked product, and the information supposedly conveyed by the mark), 623 (explaining how 
trade marks function as a company asset and indicator of corporate strength) (2004) [hereinafter 
Semiotic Analysis]. 
 74. See generally Spyros M. Maniatis, Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MARKET FREEDOM 63–130 (Adrian Sterling ed., 1997). 
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A.  Economic Functions of Trade Marks Versus the Commercial 
Magnetism of Trade Marks 
Inquiries into trade mark protection, especially from a law and 
economics perspective,75 have been a rich form of academic scholarship 
in the past century.76 That tradition continues to this day, especially 
within the context of the economic effects of antitrust and intellectual 
property law.77 
The trouble with trade mark law as opposed to other areas of 
traditional intellectual property law is that trade mark protection differs 
from the traditional intellectual property regime. This difference is even 
more evident in the legal basis and economic functions of trade marks.78 
One could argue that the difference is due to the fact that the purpose of 
traditional intellectual property protection is to create incentives in 
return for the inventor or creator realizing economic gains, even though 
the creation of trade marks does not necessarily require any form of 
‘innovativeness.’ However, this line of argument may not sit well with 
 
 75. The economic analysis of law draws upon the principles of microeconomic theory which 
concerns decision-making by individuals and small firms. For a thorough discussion, see, for 
example, ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2004); see also John 
Kay, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 337 (1993) 
(explaining how much a copyright is worth). 
 76. The law and economics movement, which began to take shape at the turn of the 
twentieth century, was not exclusively applied to trademarks per se but other forms of law that 
would entail trademarks as a form of intellectual property right such as contract law. The law and 
economics approaches to law emerged from the legal realism movement especially in American 
legal literature. For a discussion on the historical perspectives on this, see generally MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960:  THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY (1992). Perhaps one of the earliest enquiries into the pure law and economics of 
trademarks was the seminal piece by Frank Schechter, which appeared in the legal literature in 
1927. See generally Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. 
L. REV. 813 (1927) (explaining the nature and function of trademarks). Since Schechter’s work, 
other influential pieces have popped up in bits and pieces that essentially shook the foundation 
under the law and economics of trademarks without much serious aftershocks, see, e.g., William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267 
(1988), and more recently, David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 22 (2006). This is by no means an exhaustive list and as the reader will discover in 
the next few sections of this article several other important works have made similar 
contributions. 
 77. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust, 13 SW. J.L. & 
TRADE AM. 237, 237 (2007) (arguing that “when intellectual property laws are strong, then 
antitrust laws should also be strong and vice versa”). 
 78. See Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of 
Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 20 (1991). 
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the owners of trade marks who clearly believe that their trade marks and 
brands provide economic incentives.79 
Once a trade mark has been established, the trade mark owner has 
something of value.80 In Mishawaka Rubber, Justice Frankfurter 
declared that “[a] trademark is a merchandising ‘short-cut’ which 
induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to 
believe he wants.”81 Justice Frankfurter reasoned that “the owner of a 
mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to 
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a 
congenial symbol.”82 Justice Frankfurter further opined that: 
[w]hatever the means employed, the aim is the same—to convey 
through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the 
desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is 
attained, the trademark owner has something of value. If another 
poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has 
created, the owner can obtain legal redress.83 
In the above case, Justice Frankfurter framed the functions of trade 
mark for its “commercial magnetism” as part of the economic activity 
of modern society.84 Thus, one could further argue that in doing so, 
Justice Frankfurter declared the functions of trade mark to be both 
economic and legal. The dual functions of trade mark are evident in the 
opinion, which addresses the economic function in terms of the trade 
mark owner’s having “something of value” and “commercial 
magnetism” while describing the fact that “the owner can obtain legal 
redress” as the legal function.85 
Similarly, the ECJ developed the concept of how the “essential 
function” of a trade mark guarantees the identity of the origin of the 
 
 79. Brands contribute to companies by building shareholder’s value, and in 2009 the brand 
value of the world’s top five companies were valued respectively as:  Coca-Cola (USD$70B); 
IBM (USD$64B); Microsoft (USD$60B); Google (USD$43B); and GE (USD$42B). See full 
ranking at Best Global Brands 2010, INTERBRAND, http://www.interbrand.com/en/best-global-
brands/Best-Global-Brands-2010.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). The top three global brands 
have only slipped three to five percentage points since 2001. For a legal discussion on brands and 
the law, see generally Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 
2010 BYU L. REV. 1425 (discussing how trademarks and antitrust law have misunderstood 
brands). 
 80. Goodwill as an intangible asset serves as a major reason for consumers’ choice among 
brands. Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 761 (1990). 
 81. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
  
336 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 33:321 
trade marked product to the consumer.86 In addition to the guarantee of 
trade mark origin, the ECJ in Ideal-Standard said the essential function 
of a mark is also as a form of guarantee of unitary control.87 Thus, based 
on its legal definition, the essential function of a trade mark is to 
describe “the purpose and rationale of trade marks.”88 Another rationale 
for trade mark protection is the fact that trade marks have been in 
existence since primitive man began to trade with his animals, and the 
“branding of cattle and other animals” developed as the first kind of 
marking.89 Despite the nuances surrounding its history, a trade mark’s 
fundamental function is therefore to identify products and their origin.  
In modern times, the owner of a new product may apply to register 
his or her trade mark under the applicable rules in the territory where 
that particular product will be sold or marketed.90 The historical 
development of trade mark protection is nevertheless important since 
trade mark protection has been known to protect the economic trading 
activities of man.91 Furthermore, in the modern era, “the value of 
trademarks to both consumers and owners is an incentive to 
preservation, and the exclusive ownership”92 of an established trade 
 
 86. For instance, in Arsenal FC v. Reed, the ECJ said “the essential function of a trademark 
is to guarantee the identity of origin of the marked goods [ . . . ].” Case C-206/01, Arsenal 
Football Club plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10299, ¶ 48. See also Hoffman-La Roche, where the 
court said that the essential function of a trademark is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the 
trade-marked product to the consumer and to prevent confusion and interference. Case 102/77, 
Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, ¶ 7. 
 87. Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH, 1994 
E.C.R. I-2789, 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (1994), especially ¶ 37, where the court said, “for the trademark to 
be able to fulfill its role, it must offer a guarantee that all goods bearing it have been produced 
under the control of a single undertaking which is accountable for their quality.” (citing Case C-
10/89, SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. I-3752, ¶ 13.) 
 88. See TRITTON ET AL., supra note 52, at 261. For earlier discussions on trademarks quality 
see generally Schechter, supra note 76. 
 89. Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 
222, 223 (1983).  The early development or discovery of trademarks has been credited to 
archaeologists and other collectors who were not concentrating on trademarks. For more on this, 
see generally id. Diamond explained that in legal writings there have been nuances surrounding 
the historical development of trademarks and cited inconsistencies with the invention of pottery, 
which was claimed to have been invented in China in 2698 BC but was also found in Egyptian 
tombs in 3500 BC. See id. at 222–23. Other claims to the early discovery of trademarks have been 
made, but it would be beyond the scope of this article to get into the proper historical 
developments of trademarks. 
 90. Compare Besen & Raskind, supra note 78, at 21 (identifying the origin of trademark 
protection with the medieval guild practice of affixing an identifying mark to a goblet or like 
product) with Diamond, supra note 89, at 223 (identifying various inconsistencies with the origin 
of trademarks). 
 91. See Patricia Kimball Fletcher, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic Value 
of a Trademark System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 297, 302–03 (1982). 
 92. See id. at 325. 
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mark. On the one hand, trade mark owners benefit from exclusive 
ownership in order to properly deploy their trade mark-protected goods 
or services; on the other hand, consumers benefit from quality and 
choice under a trade mark system “that preserves trademarks as source 
identifiers,” leading to economies of scale and lower prices.93 Thus, it is 
hard for one to ignore the economic effect of trade marks.94 
B.  Do Trade Marks Create Monopolies? 
A trade mark is a form of property and as a form of property it 
becomes valuable to the “extent that it carries with it some degree of 
monopoly power.”95 The economic effect of trade marks is felt once 
trade mark protection has been granted.96 As Papandreou explained in 
his 1956 article, the exclusiveness of a monopoly has not changed in 
modern times, since a monopoly entails “the power to affect the choice 
or decision of the buyer.”97 
In a regulatory environment where antitrust laws are shaped to 
curb the market power of firms—if a firm gains too much market power 
it is deemed a monopoly and thus in breach of antitrust laws—then there 
should be no exception for trade mark protection. In trade marks, 
monopolies are created from the ‘exclusivity’ and the ‘absoluteness’ of 
the mark.98 Firms with well-known marks are able to corner the 
consumer with effective advertising, market entry barriers for other 
firms, and thus create monopoly profits.99 Consumers caught in the 
middle may pay little attention to the market power of the firm and thus 
find it impossible to tell whether they are benefiting from lower search 
costs, or are enhancing the monopoly profits of the firm.100 
 
 93. See id. at 326–27. 
 94. For a concise discussion of some of the economic roles of trademarks, such as helping 
the consumer to identify the “unobservable features of the trademarked product,” see Nicholas S. 
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 526 (1988). 
 95. A.G. Papandreou, The Economic Effect of Trademarks, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 503, 504 
(1956). 
 96. Id. (“The essence of this power is the asymmetrical character of the seller-buyer 
relationship. The seller, if he has monopoly power, sets his price in full view of the anticipated 
reaction of the buyer to the set price. The capacity of the seller to set higher alternative prices 
without losing all his customers to competitors is the evidence of his monopoly power. In view of 
this concept of monopoly power, it follows that to argue that a trademark has been put to 
influential use is tantamount to arguing that it has given rise to monopoly power.”). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Dan Shanahan, The Trademark Right:  Consumer Protection or Monopoly?, 72 
TRADEMARK REP. 233, 240 (1982). 
 99. See id. at 248. 
 100. For similar arguments, see Dan Shanahan, The Trademark Right:  Consumer Protection 
or Monopoly?, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 233, 248–49 (1982). 
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Monopolies or firms with excess market power reduce consumer 
choice and place on the consumer higher purchasing costs by raising 
prices.101 Monopolies also impose what economists call a ‘“deadweight 
loss’ on society by reducing their output below the level which 
consumers would be willing to purchase at a competitive price.”102 The 
intellectual property system, which grants monopoly rights to investors 
by the granting of patents, has been compared to the government system 
that pays rewards to innovators and found that the intellectual property 
system does not have much advantage over the government rewards 
system.103 
The question then becomes whether trade mark protection creates 
monopolies.104 This question is not new and has been posed several 
times in the literature on both law and economics.105 According to 
Economides, “[c]ontrary to a widespread belief, competition is not 
always beneficial to society,”106 and three distortions may result from 
perception advertising.107 “By perception advertising, a mental image 
may be added to the quality and variety features of a trademarked 
product, permitting competition in yet another dimension.”108 The three 
possible distortions are: 
(a) the ability of firms to differentiate products in perceived features 
may result in more than the optimal number of brands, counteracting 
economies of scale; (b) precommitted advertising may initially create 
monopoly power and profits, which then result in the entry of more 
than the optimal number of firms and the underproduction of each 
brand; and (c) perception advertising may distort purchasing 
decisions, depending on whether mental images are considered 
 
 101. See Lemley, supra note 77, at 241.  
 102. Id.; see also Barnes, supra note 76, at 39 (stating that deadweight loss results from the 
failure to supply search information to people who would be willing to pay some amount greater 
than the marginal cost of supplying a good to them but less than the price with a mark-up to cover 
the cost of producing search information). 
 103. See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property 
Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 525–26 (2001). 
 104. In hindsight, the straightforward answer is affirmative “since a trademark is principally 
an open ended monopoly for exclusive use—a monopoly that is legally assigned and enforced by 
extending the property rights concept far into the realm of intangibles.” Hannes Rösler, The 
Rationale for European Trade Mark Protection, 29 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 100, 100 (2007); 
see also Papandreou, supra note 95, at 504.  
 105. See, e.g., Economides, supra note 94, at 532 (citing EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE 
THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56–70 (8th ed. 1969) [hereinafter CHAMBERLIN 8th 
ed.]).  
 106. Economides, supra note 94, at 533. 
 107. Id. at 532. 
 108. Id. 
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valuable. These potential distortions, however, are more than offset 
by the efficiencies arising from a trademark’s ability to distinguish 
between goods with unobservable variances in quality and variety 
features.109 
These views by Economides are interesting, and the above passage 
captures both the law and economics of trade marks, as well as the 
overriding theme of this article:  that trade marks create monopolies. 
One of the earliest known court cases where trade mark protection 
was equated with monopoly was the eighteenth-century English case 
Blanchard v. Hill.110 The case concerned a charter granted by King 
Charles to a card-maker who was given the exclusive right to use a 
certain stamp.111 The court refused to enjoin a second card-maker from 
using the same stamp on his playing cards.112 During the course of the 
opinion, Lord Hardwicke referred to the charter as “one of those 
monopolies which were so frequent” under certain earlier monarchs.113 
This tells us that the courts have always treated trade marks as another 
form of intellectual property:  monopolies. Trade mark protection 
seemed to enjoy a certain period of monopoly protection, however, 
before it was again brought before the courts due to the enactment of 
antitrust law in the United States, and other consumer protection laws in 
parts of Europe, prior to the creation of the European Union. Outside of 
the courts, academic literature on the law and economics of trade marks 
took the debate to a new level. 
The literature on the law and economics of trade marks is not so 
large and it is at best divided into two competing camps:  the Harvard 
School and the Chicago School (and to be fair to Europe, the Austrian 
School).114 The Chicago School is often seen as the more domineering 
of the two schools, as is evidenced in the writing of scholars such as 
Landes & Posner, and Barnes. The law and economics of other areas of 
intellectual property on the other hand, is voluminous, in particular 
relating to copyrights and patents.115 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Blanchard, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. supra note 47, at 692–94 (2 ATK 484–86); for 
comments, see, for example, Norma Dawson, English Trade Mark Law in the Eighteenth 
Century:  Blanchard v. Hill Revisited—Another ‘Case of Monopolies’?, 24 J. LEGAL HIST. 111 
(2003). 
 111. Blanchard, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep., supra note 47, at 692–93 (2 ATK 484–85). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 693. 
 114. See, e.g., JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 60, at 33 (“The Austrian School embraces a 
theory of dynamic competition which goes beyond that advanced by Schumpeter.”). 
 115. The modern literature has its historical foundation in the legacy of Frank I. Schechter’s 
1927 seminal article, see supra note 76. Since then, the economic effects of trademarks have 
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The different sets of literature used in this paper thus far reveals 
one thing—they all advocate different approaches to the economic 
analyses of trade marks. For instance, Professor David Barnes argues 
that a trade mark is a public good and “the entire trademark literature 
has failed to appreciate the market failures associated with the supply of 
trademarks and the information they provide about products and sources 
of products.”116 This recent work by Professor Barnes is impressive and 
gives a thorough discussion of trade marks as public goods. He argues 
that public goods theory demonstrates that market failures justify 
government intervention and therefore are similar to other branches of 
intellectual property such as patents and copyrights. This thesis supports 
my argument that the relationship between trade marks as a branch of 
intellectual property and antitrust needs clarification.117 Another 
argument that is quite popular in the literature is that trade mark is a tool 
for pursuing efficiency.118 This argument is represented in the 
scholarship of Landes & Posner, using an economic model of property 
rights.119 Furthermore, even more recent scholarship argues that 
“property-based trademark protection risks . . . creating unjustified and 
inappropriate market power.”120 
The two sparring camps on the literature on the law and economics 
—the Chicago School and the Harvard School—both have their 
advantages and disadvantages. The Chicago School121 of thought, as 
developed by Posner, argues that trade mark protection lowers the 
 
appeared roughly every ten years, see for instance Papandreou, supra note 95. This began to 
change course with Richard Posner’s economic analysis of the law, RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1974), and subsequent works such as William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:  An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987) 
[hereinafter Trademark Law] and also sources cited therein; other notable economic analyses of 
trademark law in recent years include Barnes, supra note 76, at 35 (arguing that trademarks are a 
species of public goods, in particular, mixed public goods). 
 116. Barnes, supra note 76, at 24. 
 117. Id. at 35. 
 118. Trademark Law, supra note 115, at 265–66. 
 119. Id. at 266–68. 
 120. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 373 (1999). 
 121. The Chicago School of law and economics is more dominating in the literature to the 
extent that there is no “alternative account of trademark law doctrine.” Semiotic Analysis, supra 
note 73, at 623–24; see generally Trademark Law, supra note 115. 
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consumer search cost, 122 while the Harvard School centers on the 
monopolistic nature of trade marks.123 
The Chicago School analysis of antitrust is entrenched in the 
model of perfect competition which is based on the assumption that all 
sellers sell a homogenous product so that buyers are indifferent about 
from whom they buy if prices are the same.124 This is by no means the 
only assumption of the model of perfect competition on which the 
Chicago School is based. The model also assumes that each seller is 
small in proportion to the entire market so that his determinations about 
output and price do not affect output and price in the market, that all 
sellers have the same access to all kinds of inputs, and that all 
participants have full knowledge about all the relevant factors in the 
market.125 
The Harvard School (the monopolist school of thought) argues that 
trade mark protection, through the control of distinct product markets by 
their owners, inherently leads to monopoly.126 This article fits within 
this camp. Regardless, these schools of thought add considerable 
support for the rational basis of trade mark protection, and seemingly 
agree that trade marks reduce the consumer’s search cost and open more 
choices to the consumer. Thus, the consumer is able to distinguish 
quality goods from those whose origin may not necessarily be of the 
same standard. The results of the early case law discussion and the 
economic literature suggests that trade marks evolve into monopolies. 
IV.  TRADE MARK DISTINCTIVENESS AND ECONOMIC DISTINCTIVENESS 
 A recent empirical study reported that 26.7% of respondents 
thought that the word “wonderful” indicated the source of the chocolate 
coconut macaroons (cookies) depicted in the stimulus, even when the 
authors regarded the use as ‘non-trademark use’ and placed the word in 
small font at the bottom-right-hand corner of the package.127 The 
authors advocated abandoning the non-inherently distinctive category of 
 
 122. For empirical evidence in support of search cost rationale, see I.P.L. Png & David 
Reitman, Why are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 J.L. & ECON. 207, 208–11 
(1995). 
 123. See, e.g., CHAMBERLIN 8th ed., supra note 105, at 56–70, 270–74; Lunney, Jr., supra 
note 120, at 368 (especially n.6); Papandreou, supra note 95, at 504. 
 124. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 1.1(a). 
 125. See id. 
 126. See Lunney, Jr., supra note 120, at 370. 
 127. See Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of 
Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1090, 1097, fig. 5d. (2009). 
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word marks in the threshold evaluation of trade mark distinctiveness.128 
Although the authors admitted that their proposal is “heretical,” 129 this 
part of the article will seek to actually develop the arguments for 
distinctiveness and examine more closely what this article terms the 
economics of distinctiveness in trade marks. The arguments are centered 
primarily on analysis of cases in the ECJ and the Office for 
Harmonization of the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) 
(OHIM). 
Professor Barton Beebe has identified two forms of trade mark 
distinctiveness, namely “source distinctiveness, which describes the 
trademark’s distinctiveness of source, and differential distinctiveness, 
which describes the trademark’s distinctiveness from other 
trademarks.”130 These two forms of trade mark distinctiveness form part 
of the overall concept of distinctiveness in trade mark law, and the 
concept of distinctiveness “is the hinge on which trademark law 
turns.”131 It is an undisputed fact that “[t]rade marks are a source of 
information[;] [t]hey are the byproduct of market enterprise and market 
place competition.”132 As such, trade marks’ distinctiveness is an 
essential component of the registration of trade marks.133 
A trade mark becomes eligible for registration when it has, among 
other things, a distinctive character. Under the EU’s Trade Marks 
Directive, a trade mark may be refused registration or declared invalid 
where it is registered, if it is found to be “devoid of any distinctive 
character.”134 On a comparative note, similar language can be found in 
similar statutes in other jurisdictions. For example, under Section 41 of 
 
 128. Id. at 1038. 
 129. Id. at 1039. 
 130. Semiotic Analysis, supra note 73, at 621; see also Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion 
in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2028 (2005). 
 131. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK W. JANIS, TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY:  A 
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 52 (2008). 
 132. CATHERINE COLSTON & KIRSTY MIDDLETON, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 501 (2d ed. 2005). 
 133. As recently argued by one scholar, “trade mark law only protects ‘distinctive’ marks, 
because only distinctive marks are likely to signify product source to consumers and because 
effective competition requires that competitors have access to commonplace, descriptive, and 
generic words and symbols.” Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of 
“Trademark Use”, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 378 (2006) [hereinafter Barrett, Internet 
Trademark Suits]. 
 134. Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, at L 299/27; “[T]he grounds for refusal or 
invalidity concerning the trade mark itself, for example, the absence of any distinctive character.” 
Id. at L 299/26. 
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the Australian Trade Marks Act,135 distinctiveness is a condition of 
registration,136 and in other parts of the Australian Trade Marks Act, a 
lack of distinction may be used to oppose registration of the mark.137 
In addition, a lack of distinctiveness may be used to rectify the 
register and cancel a mark.138 Furthermore, the concept of 
distinctiveness is key to determining whether there has been an 
infringement.139 Distinctiveness under Section 41 of the Australian 
Trade Marks Act has been tested on several occasions before Australian 
courts, where the courts confirmed that Section 41 conceives three 
methods by which a word or symbol may be capable of distinguishing 
the applicant’s goods or services from goods or services of other 
persons.140 
In the United States, distinctiveness is covered by the Lanham 
Trademark Act,141 where eligibility for trade mark protection requires 
that the mark be distinctive and used in commerce.142 The 
‘distinctiveness’ requirement in the United States addresses a trade 
mark’s capacity for identifying and distinguishing goods and services 
from one producer.143 Trade marks are traditionally divided into four 
categories of distinctiveness:  arbitrary/fanciful, suggestive, descriptive, 
and generic.144 These four conditions were earlier established in 
Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, pertaining to word marks.145 
To ascertain the distinctiveness criteria in Europe, this article will 
turn to cases from the ECJ and the Board of Appeals of the OHIM, but 
 
 135. Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (Austl.). Under Section 41, there are indications of three 
main types of distinctiveness. First, Section 41(3) provides “the trade mark is inherently adapted 
to distinguish . . .”; second, Section 41(5) provides that “the trade mark is to some extent 
inherently adapted to distinguish . . . that the mark is capable of so distinguishing . . .”; and last, 
Section 41(6) provides that “the trade mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish.” 
 136. Id. § 41(2). 
 137. Id. §§ 41(2), 88(1)(a)–(2)(a). 
 138. Id.  
 139. See id. § 120. 
 140. Id. § 41. Therese Catanzariti, Mark of Cain—Distinctiveness in the Trade Marks Act 5 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative 
Law Review) (citing Unilever Austl. Ltd. v. Karounos (2001) 113 FCR 322, 335 ¶ 46 (Austl.)) 
available at http://www.13wentworthselbornechambers.com.au/pdfs/distinctivenessintrademark 
law.pdf; see also Chocolaterie Guylian NV v. Registrar of Trade Marks (2009) 82 IPR 13 
(Austl.); ROBERT R. BURRELL & MICHAEL M. HANDLER, AUSTRALIAN TRADEMARK LAW 77–
138 (2011). 
 141. See generally Lanham Act, supra note 9. 
 142. Id. §§ 1051(b)(3)(B), (D). 
 143. Id. § 1052. 
 144. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 145. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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first will properly define distinctiveness146 and try to make sense, if any, 
out of economic distinctiveness. 
A.  ‘Distinguish’ and ‘Distinctive’:  The Dichotomy of Distinctiveness 
One of the recurring features, or more precisely, frequent words in 
the various trade mark laws mentioned above is the appearance of the 
verb ‘distinguish’ or its adjective ‘distinguishing.’147 The meaning of a 
word or phrase has an impact on how the law is interpreted. In 
hindsight, one could easily argue that the verb ‘distinguish’ points out a 
difference between two people or things. Similarly, it could be argued 
that the adjective ‘distinctive,’ from which ‘distinctiveness’ is derived, 
serves to distinguish a person or thing from others. As coherent (or 
perhaps incoherent) such an argument may be, it is not authoritative for 
the purposes of legal interpretation, although some courts refer to 
dictionaries for literal interpretation of words in order to reach a 
decision.148 Depending on the jurisdiction, courts and arbitrators 
generally turn to dictionaries in their language or versions of a language 
to obtain precisely the meaning of words that need interpretation for 
legal purposes.149 This article relies on Webster’s College Dictionary to 
argue that ‘distinguish’ means “to mark off as different” or “to set apart 
as different.”150 ‘Distinctive’ is also defined in the same dictionary as 
“serving to distinguish; characteristics.”151 
In a legal context, consumers in the Anglo-Saxon world are easily 
informed by the mark ‘Coca-Cola’ that the item is a genuine product of 
The Coca-Cola Company Inc.; however, consumers outside the Anglo-
Saxon world, might easily confuse the sign ‘Coco-Coke’ or ‘Coca-
Colla’ as that of The Coca-Cola Company Inc., when it is in fact that of 
a domestic rival marketing a similar product to stimulate healthy 
competition in the economy.152 The argument here is that because 
 
 146. A mark that is inherently distinctive qualifies for registration under the Lanham Act. 
Lanham Act, supra note 9, § 2(f). Furthermore, a mark can also qualify for trade mark protection 
under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act if the mark has become distinctive through use in 
connection with the applicant’s goods commerce, known as acquired distinctiveness. See In re 
Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1350–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 147. See, e.g., Trade Marks Act 1995 § 41. 
 148. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dept. of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2011). 
 149. Id. 
 150. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 358 (2005). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Rory Carroll, Coca Colla:  The New ‘Real Thing’ in Bolivia, GUARDIAN.CO.UK 
(Apr. 14, 2010, 19:23 BST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/14/coca-colla-real-thing-
bolivia. For similar line of arguments, see generally Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 1 (examining 
trademark use theory). 
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“[t]rademark law centers its analysis on consumer confusion . . . the 
basic rule of trademark law is that a defendant’s use of a mark is illegal 
if it confuses a substantial number of consumers.”153 Furthermore, due 
to the current state of law, the judiciary increasingly exercises a 
“willingness to find an actionable likelihood of confusion” of any 
unauthorized use of a strong trade mark “with the potential to 
undermine the symbol’s trademark distinctiveness.”154 
According to Professor Barton Beebe, the traditional notions of 
‘inherent’ and ‘acquired’ distinctiveness tend to be confusing, not 
clarifying.155 This article strives, therefore, to provide a proper 
definition of distinctiveness in trade mark law. Professor Beebe himself 
provides the following explanation: 
Under current doctrine, to fall within the subject matter of trademark 
protection, a trademark must be found to be inherently distinctive or 
to possess acquired distinctiveness. An inherently distinctive 
trademark is one whose signifier cannot reasonably be understood to 
be descriptive or decorative of the product to which it is affixed.156 
In order to ascertain inherent distinctiveness in trade mark 
litigation, trade marks must be “suggestive” and “arbitrary or 
fanciful.”157 In contrast, acquired distinctiveness evolves through 
“secondary meaning.”158 Secondary meaning is achieved when a mark 
has become so distinctive that the public closely associates the mark 
with a single source.159 Trade marks with inherent distinctiveness, 
however, are marks that are capable of functioning immediately upon 
use.160 
The ECJ’s decision in Baby-Dry defined the nature of 
distinctiveness in the EU.161 The Court said that the term ‘Baby-Dry’ 
was an invented term and as such does not form part of the English 
 
 153. Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 
(2010). 
 154. Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman:  The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 
YALE L. J. 1717, 1722 (1999). 
 155. See supra note 131, at 52. 
 156. Beebe, supra note 73, at 669–70. 
 157. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9. 
 158. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992), where the Court 
described trade marks with “secondary meaning” as those which “may acquire the distinctiveness 
which will allow them to be protected under the [US Lanham] Act.”  
 159. Id. at 765, n.4. 
 160. See id. at 770. 
 161. Case C-383/99 P, Procter & Gamble v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. 
(Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2001 E.C.R. I-6251, ¶¶ 39–42. 
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language, making it eligible for registration.162 The Court reasoned that 
such words “are lexical inventions bestowing distinctive power on the 
mark so formed and may not be refused registration.”163 The case 
concerned an application filed by Procter & Gamble for a CTM 
regarding disposable diapers for babies, which was refused registration 
for being devoid of any distinctive character.164 Upon appeal to the ECJ, 
the Court reversed the OHIM decision and thus defined distinctiveness 
in the EU.165 
Overall, distinctiveness is a broad term that has littered trade mark 
litigation and is merely what Professor Beebe refers to as “a general 
term which trademark lawyers have long used to refer 
indiscriminately—and apparently unwittingly—to one or the other of 
two very different species of distinctiveness.”166 
B.  Economic Distinctiveness 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Blackmun once proclaimed that the 
“free flow of commercial information is indispensable.”167 His 
proclamation confirms the widely held theory that trade marks reduce 
consumer search cost, given that “consumer acquisition of information 
has a search cost,”168 and the “informational efficiency of trademarks 
permits entry at a low cost, particularly when consumers already 
recognize a trademark from another market.”169 In addition, the search 
cost rationale for trade mark protection has been echoed by several 
scholars, such as Professor Nicholas Economides, who argued that from 
 
 162. Id. ¶ 43. The court further stated:  “Whilst each of the two words in the combination may 
form part of expressions used in everyday speech to designate the functions of babies’ nappies, 
their syntactically unusual juxtaposition is not a familiar expression in the English language, 
either for designating babies’ nappies or for describing their essential characteristics.” Id. 
 163. Id. ¶ 44. 
 164. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
 165. Id. ¶¶ 39–46. 
 166. Beebe, Search and Persuasion, supra note 130, at 20–28. 
 167. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 
(1976). 
 168. William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEMPHIS 
STATE L. REV. 199, 215 (1991); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 
163–64 (1995). 
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source identifying mark, 
“reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,” 
(citation omitted) for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—
the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items 
that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. 
Id. 
 169. Kratzke, supra note 168, at 217. 
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an economic standpoint, the argument for trade marks is an easy one.170 
In plain language, Economides explained that the economic role of the 
trade mark is to help the consumer identify the unobservable features of 
the trade marked product.171 
Taking a cue from this statement, where the words ‘economic’ and 
‘unobservable’ are in the same sentence,172 it is possible to argue that 
these words form the nuclei of economic distinctiveness—which, in 
trade mark law, is the ability of a trade mark proprietor who seeks 
registration to be able to distinguish his goods or services from that of 
the competitor. The proprietor has invented a new word, sign, or symbol 
that is capable of being represented graphically to be the source of 
information for his goods and services. The trade mark proprietor seeks 
to foster competition by being able to distinguish himself and reap the 
economic benefits of his distinctiveness. 
Thus in its broadest sense, economic distinctiveness in trade mark 
law “reduces consumer search costs, promotes market place efficiency, 
and enables producers to reap the benefits of their investment in product 
quality and business goodwill, thus providing an incentive to strive for 
quality.”173 On the other side of the coin is the need for competitors to 
be in one or more product markets, and the presence of a competitor in 
more than one product market affects consumer perceptions of trade 
marks in those markets, and eventually, the messages that trade marks 
convey.174 
C.  Distinctiveness in SAT.2:  As Seen by the ECJ 
The trade mark regime in the EU is an autonomous system with its 
own set of rules and objectives peculiar to it and applied independently 
 
 170. See Economides, supra note 94, at 526–27.  
In many markets, sellers have much better information as to the unobservable features 
of a commodity for sale than the buyers. This is known as information asymmetry. 
Unobservable features, valued by the consumer, may be crucial determinants of the 
total value of the good. . . . [I]f there is a way to identify the unobservable qualities, the 
consumer’s choice becomes clear . . . . The economic role of the trademark is to help 
the consumer identify the unobservable features of the trademarked product. This 
information is not provided to the consumer in an analytic form, such as an indication 
of size or a listing of ingredients, but rather in summary form, through a symbol which 
the consumer identifies with a specific combination of features. Information in analytic 
form is a complement to, rather than a substitute for, trademarks. 
Id. 
 171. Id. at 526. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits, supra note 133, at 376. 
 174. Kratzke, supra note 168, at 209. 
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of any national system.175 This autonomous system of trade mark 
regime in the EU has consistently been confirmed by the highest 
judicial body—the ECJ. The ECJ has held that distinctiveness needs to 
be viewed as a whole and has set aside a judgment of the General Court 
(previously known as the Court of First Instance).176  
In SAT.2, the General Court had found that the OHIM had not 
infringed Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 40/94 (now the CTMR) by 
refusing to register as a Community trade mark the term ‘SAT.2,’ in 
respect of services which are connected with satellite broadcasting.177 
The bone of contention in SAT.2 was the German broadcaster SAT.1’s 
application to register the mark ‘SAT.2’ as a CTM for certain goods and 
various services, mainly in the media and information sector.178 The 
OHIM refused the application on the ground that that term was devoid 
of any distinctive character.179 SAT.1 contested the OHIM’s decision 
before the General Court which focused on the interpretation of Article 
7(1)(b) of Regulation 40/94.180  
Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 40/94 states that trade marks devoid 
of any distinctive character shall not be registered, unless “the trade 
mark has become distinctive in relation to the goods or services for 
which registration is requested in consequence of the use which has 
been made of it.”181 The General Court annulled the decision of the 
OHIM in relation to all other services, but stated that there was an 
absolute ground in refusing to register the trade mark with regard to 
services that have a connection to satellite broadcasting.182 
The General Court’s decision was appealed before the ECJ, which 
rendered its decision on September 16, 2004.183 The ECJ confirmed that 
the essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of 
the origin of the marked product to the consumer or end-user by 
 
 175. See Case C-488/06, L & D SA v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade 
Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (citing Case C-238/06 P, Develey Holding GmbH & Co. 
Beteiligungs KG v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs) 
(OHIM), 2007 E.C.R. I-9375, ¶¶ 65–66)). 
 176.  Case C-329/02 P, SAT.1 SatellitenFernsehen GmbH v. Office for Harmonisation in the 
Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2004 E.C.R. I-8338, ¶ 25. 
 177. Id. ¶¶ 9–15. 
 178. Id. ¶ 6 (stating that the application was made on April 15, 1997). 
 179. Id. ¶ 8. 
 180. Id. ¶ 9. 
 181. CTMR, supra note 7, art. 7(3) (the OHIM decision was also contested under Article 
7(1)(c)). 
 182. SAT.1, 2004 E.C.R. I-8338, ¶ 12. 
 183. Id. at 1. 
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enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the 
product or service from others which have another origin.184 
The Court held, “Article 7(1)(b) of the regulation is thus intended 
to preclude registration of trade marks which are devoid of distinctive 
character which alone renders them capable of fulfilling that essential 
function.”185 It reasoned that 
in order to determine whether a sign presents a characteristic such as 
to render it registrable as a trade mark, it is appropriate to take the 
viewpoint of the relevant public. Where the goods or services with 
which the registration application is concerned are intended for all 
consumers, the relevant public must be deemed to be composed of 
the average consumer, reasonably well-informed and reasonably 
observant and circumspect.186 
Further, the Court held that 
as regards a trade mark comprising words or a word and a digit . . . 
the distinctiveness of each of those terms or elements, taken 
separately, may be assessed, in part, but must, in any event, depend 
on an appraisal of the whole which they comprise.187 
Citing Campina and KPN,188 the Court said that the mere fact that 
each of those elements, considered separately, “is devoid of distinctive 
character does not mean that their combination cannot present a 
distinctive character.”189 The ECJ in SAT.2 said the General Court 
misinterpreted the provision of Article 7(1)(b) and failed to make an 
examination of the distinctive character of a compound trade mark “as a 
whole.”190 The General Court based its decision 
on the presumption that elements individually devoid of distinctive 
character cannot, on being combined, present such a character 
instead of, as it should have done, on the overall perception of that 
word by the average consumer.191 
 
 184. SAT.1, 2004 E.C.R. I-8338, ¶ 23 (citing Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche v. 
Centrafarm, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, ¶ 7). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. ¶ 24. 
 187. Id. ¶ 28. 
 188. Case C-265/00, Campina Melkunie BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, 2004 E.C.R. I-1705, 
¶¶ 40–41;  Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., 
2002 E.C.R. I-5490, ¶¶ 99–100. 
 189. SAT. 1, 2004 E.C.R. I-8338, ¶ 28. 
 190. Id. ¶¶ 29–30. 
 191. Id. ¶ 35. 
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The ECJ observed that “[r]egistration of a sign as a trade mark is 
not subject to a finding of a specific level of linguistic or artistic 
creativity or imaginativeness on the part of the proprietor of the 
trademark,” but rather that “the trademark should enable the relevant 
public to identify the origin of the goods or services protected thereby 
and to distinguish them from those of other undertakings.”192 
Furthermore, the Court argued that the “frequent use of trade marks 
consisting of a word and a number in the telecommunications sector 
indicates that that type of combination cannot be considered to be 
devoid, in principle, of distinctive character,”193 and went on to annul 
the General Court’s ruling. 
In later cases, the ECJ followed reasoning similar to that in SAT.2 
by arguing that the assessment of a compound mark 
of its distinctive character cannot be limited to an evaluation of each 
of its words or components, considered in isolation, but must, on any 
view, be based on the overall perception of that mark by the relevant 
public and not on the presumption that elements individually devoid 
of distinctive character cannot, on being combined, have a distinctive 
character.194 
In Eurohypo, the Court said that the correct way to interpret Article 7 is 
to do a separate and independent examination of the grounds for refusal 
listed in Article 7(1) of the CTMR.195 
 
 192. Id. ¶ 41. 
 193. Id. ¶ 44. 
 194. Case C-304/06, Eurohypo AG v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade 
Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2008 E.C.R. I-03297, ¶ 41. 
 195. Id. ¶ 54. Eurohypo AG was denied registration of the word/sign “EUROHYPO” by 
OHIM, which essentially “held that the components EURO and HYPO contained a clearly 
understandable indication of the characteristics” of financial services in class 36 of the Nice 
Agreement and that: 
the combination of those two components in one word did not render the mark less 
descriptive. Therefore, it held that the word sign EUROHYPO was descriptive of 
“financial affairs; monetary affairs; real estate affairs; provision of financial services; 
financing” and that it was, therefore, devoid of any distinctive character within the 
meaning of Article 7(1)(b) [of the Community trade mark regulation], at least in 
German-speaking countries, and that that ground was sufficient, under Article 7(2) of 
the regulation, to justify a refusal of protection.  
Id. ¶ 10. The OHIM decision was contested before the General Court in 2004 claiming 
infringement of Article 74(1) and Article 7(1)(b) of the Community trademark regulation. The 
General Court rejected both pleas, which was appealed to the EUCJ, which in turn dismissed the 
action against the OHIM and set aside the judgment of the General Court. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 23, 65. 
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D.  Acquired Distinctiveness 
1.  The OHIM Board of Appeals and Acquired Distinctiveness 
in Color Marks 
As with the many developments in trade mark law, one must 
constantly turn to the judicial bodies for legal guidance and often the 
state of play. The results of surveys are often some of the more 
compelling evidence that a proprietor can use to argue that a mark has 
acquired distinctiveness through use (or secondary meaning, as it is 
referred in some jurisdictions). Acquired distinctiveness or secondary 
meaning refers to the situation that arises when a mark might be 
ineligible for registration were it not for the fact that its use has come to 
be closely associated with particular goods in a relevant market.196 
In a recent decision, the Board of Appeals of the OHIM confirmed 
the examiner’s decision that Andreas Stihl AG & Co KG’s197 color 
mark was not inherently distinctive, but held that the mark had acquired 
distinctive character under Article 7(3) of the CTMR. The Board of 
Appeals relied mostly on survey evidence and other evidence on its 
distribution channels in the Community submitted by Stihl, which 
showed that it has used the mark in all of the relevant Member States of 
the EU and that by far it is the market leader in the specific, definable 
market segment of power-driven cut-off saws or hand-held 
chainsaws.198 
The case by Stihl arose from an application to the OHIM in 2005 
for a CTM under “class 7” for power tools, and claimed the colors 
orange and grey; however, in 2007, the mark was refused registration 
and the examiner argued that the mark “is devoid of any distinctive 
character to distinguish the goods in question.”199 Stihl appealed the 
decision and argued that 
even a color per se can be inherently distinctive in exceptional 
circumstances, and particularly where the number of goods . . . for 
which the mark is claimed for [sic] is very restricted and the relevant 
market is very specific.200 
 
 196. Cf. Case R 355/2007-4, Andreas Stihl AG & Co. KG, Decision of the Fourth Board of 
Appeal of 30 November 2009, ¶ 27, available at http://oami.europa.eu/LegalDocs/BoA/2007/en/ 
R0355_2007-4.pdf. 
 197. Id. ¶¶ 25–26, 48. 
 198. See id. ¶ 38. 
 199. Id. ¶ 6(d). 
 200. Id. ¶ 7(b). 
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Having considered the inherent distinctiveness of the mark, the 
OHIM Board of Appeal concluded that the combination of orange and 
grey itself could not perform the function of a trade mark and that such 
distinctiveness would have to have been acquired and the relevant 
public would have to have become accustomed to the colors as a result 
of “intense” use.201 
Article 7(3) CTMR not only requires intense use of the sign by the 
appellant, but goes further than that. . . . The identification, by the 
relevant public, of the product as originating from a given 
undertaking must be the result of the use of the mark as a trade mark 
and thus the result of the nature and effect of it, which make it 
capable of distinguishing the products concerned from those of other 
undertakings.202 
Stihl, in its appeal, claimed that the mark in question had acquired 
distinctiveness in the Community through use within the meaning of 
Article 7(3) of the CTMR, and consequently was eligible for 
registration.203 The Board of Appeals was satisfied that the two market 
surveys conducted in France and Germany were sufficient for acquired 
distinctiveness.204 
These figures are impressive and come close to the maximum of 
what can be reasonably obtained in a market survey . . . [and] shows 
that the majority of the public not only recognises the colours and 
sees them as a mark, but also has a strong affinity to the producer.205 
The Board of Appeals argued that at least one of the surveys 
showed that Stihl acquired distinctiveness in both France and Germany, 
and therefore could be 
extrapolated to the other Member States of the Community under the 
proviso that the amount of use is comparable so that it can be 
expected that the same amount of use triggers the same consumer 
recognition.206 
In concluding, the Board of Appeals said Stihl was “successful in 
demonstrating that the subject-matter of the CTM application in 
question has acquired distinctiveness . . . within the meaning of Article 
7(3) CTMR.”207 
 
 201. Id. ¶ 26. 
 202. Stihl, supra note 196, ¶ 30. 
 203. Id. ¶ 28. 
 204. Id. ¶ 45. 
 205. Id. ¶ 42. 
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 207. Id. ¶ 48. 
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2.  The ECJ and Acquired Distinctiveness in Slogans: 
The Audi Decision 
More recently, the ECJ had the opportunity to review the 
requirements for distinctiveness in trade mark registration and its ruling 
was of particular importance. In the Audi decision,208 the ECJ annulled 
the General Court’s refusal209 to register as a CTM Audi’s ‘Vorsprung 
durch Technik’210 mark for a broad range of goods and services ranging 
from jewelry to insurance (other than vehicles).211 
The sequence of events leading up to the Audi decision began in 
the OHIM in 2003 when Audi applied for registration of ‘Vorsprung 
durch Technik’ as a CTM under the various classes.212 The OHIM 
refused to register the word mark and argued that it constituted a form 
of “descriptive advertising,” and as such is devoid of any distinctive 
character in respect to those goods and services in the classes for which 
it applied, but could be accepted for motor vehicles and components.213 
Audi challenged the findings of the OHIM, and the Board of 
Appeal “considered that the distinction drawn by the examiner between 
goods and services relating to technology was dubious.”214 The General 
Court upheld the Board of Appeal decision, ruling that an advertising 
slogan was “distinctive only if it could be immediately perceived as an 
indication of the commercial origin of the goods or services in 
question.”215 Audi appealed the decision to the ECJ to annul the General 
Court’s decision.216 
The ECJ argued that “distinctive character must be assessed, first, 
by reference to the goods or services in respect of which registration has 
been applied for and, second, by reference to the relevant public’s 
perception of the mark.”217 But the Court directed most of its 
observation to the word mark, stating that regarding “marks made up of 
signs or indications that are also used as advertising slogans, indications 
of quality or incitements to purchase the goods or services covered by 
 
 208. Case C-398/08 P, Audi AG v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade 
Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2010 E.C.R. I-00535, ¶ 18 [hereinafter Audi II]. 
 209. Case T-70/06, Audi AG v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks 
and Designs) (OHIM), 2008 E.C.R. II-131. 
 210. Loosely translated as “advantage through technology” or “progress through technology.” 
 211. Audi II, 2010 E.C.R. I-00535, ¶ 4. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. ¶ 54. 
 214. Id. ¶ 9. 
 215. Id. ¶ 18. 
 216. Id. ¶ 1.  
 217. Audi II, 2010 E.C.R. I-00535, ¶ 34. 
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those marks, registration of such marks is not excluded as such by virtue 
of such use.”218 The Court, citing Merz & Krell and OHIM v. Erpo 
Mobelwerk, said the distinctive character of such marks was 
inappropriate to apply to slogan criteria which are stricter than those 
applicable to other types of signs.219 The Court reasoned that, 
while the criteria for the assessment of distinctive character are the 
same for different categories of marks, it may be that, for the 
purposes of applying those criteria, the relevant public’s perception 
is not necessarily the same in relation to each of those categories and 
it could therefore prove more difficult to establish distinctiveness in 
relation to marks of certain categories as compared with marks of 
other categories.220 
The ECJ held that 
difficulties in establishing distinctiveness which may be associated 
with word marks consisting of advertising slogans because of their 
very nature . . . do not justify laying down specific criteria 
supplementing or derogating from the criterion of distinctiveness as 
interpreted in [previous] case-law.221 
The ECJ was particularly harsh on the General Court regarding 
what it perceived as an “erroneous interpretation” of the principles that 
had been established by the case law.222 The Court said “the General 
Court did not substantiate its findings to the effect that the mark applied 
for will not be perceived by the relevant public as an indication of the 
commercial origin of the goods and services in question” and “merely 
highlighted the fact that [the] mark consists of, and is understood as, a 
promotional formula.”223 
[I]t should be noted that the laudatory connotation of a word mark 
does not mean that it cannot be appropriate for the purposes of 
guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods or services which 
it covers. Thus, such a mark can be perceived by the relevant public 
both as a promotional formula and as an indication of the 
commercial origin of goods or services. It follows that, in so far as 
the public perceives the mark as an indication of that origin, the fact 
that the mark is at the same time understood—perhaps even 
 
 218. Id. ¶ 35. 
 219. Id. (citing  Case C-517/99, Merz & Krell GmbH & Co., 2001 E.C.R. I-6959, ¶ 40; Case 
C-64/02 P, Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) v. 
Erpo Möbelwerk GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-10051, ¶ 41). 
 220. Id. ¶ 37. 
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 222. Id. ¶ 40. 
 223. Audi II, 2010 E.C.R. I-00535, ¶ 46. 
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primarily understood—as a promotional formula has no bearing on 
its distinctive character.224 
Equally, the ECJ said the analysis of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 
40/94 was misapplied by the General Court. According to the Court, 
where such marks are not descriptive for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c), 
“they can express an objective message . . . and still be capable of 
indicating to the consumer the commercial origin of the goods or 
services in question.”225 The aura of psychological impact was key to 
how the ECJ framed the idea of an “objective message” when it stated 
that, where the mark is not purely an ordinary advertising message, “but 
possess[es] a certain originality or resonance, requiring at least some 
interpretation by the relevant public, or setting off a cognitive process in 
the minds of that public,” it can “express an objective message, even a 
simple one, and still be capable of indicating to the consumer the 
commercial origin of the good or service in question.”226 
Even if it were to be supposed that the slogan ‘Vorsprung durch 
Technik’ conveys an objective message to the effect that 
technological superiority enables the manufacture and supply of 
better goods and services, that fact would not support the conclusion 
that the mark applied for is devoid of any inherently distinctive 
character. However simple such a message may be, it cannot be 
categorized as ordinary to the point of excluding, from the outset and 
without any further analysis, the possibility that that mark is capable 
of indicating to the consumer the commercial origin of the goods or 
services in question.227 
The ECJ then concluded that the slogan “exhibits a certain 
originality and resonance which makes it easy to remember.”228 It has 
been widely used by Audi for years, and as such, “it cannot be excluded 
that the fact that members of the relevant public are used to establishing 
the link between that slogan and [Audi] motor vehicles . . . also makes it 
easier for that public to identify the commercial origin of the goods or 
services covered.”229 
By its judgment in Audi, the ECJ essentially confirmed that 
evidence of acquired distinctiveness is crucial to the assessment of 
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distinctiveness under the European trade mark regime.230 Similarly, in 
Adidas v. Marca, the ECJ ruled that trade marks are a sign of origin and 
as such the defendant’s mark was similar to that of the plaintiff.231  
V.  ANTITRUST AND TRADE MARK RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ARTICLE 102 OF THE TFEU 
Article 102 is one of the two main antitrust provisions of the 
TFEU.232 Article 102 seeks to prevent the abuse of a dominant position, 
such as a monopoly. Since a trade mark is in essence a legal monopoly, 
the relationship between trade mark rights and Article 102 is an 
important one. We are reminded of this important relationship in the 
ECJ’s Arsenal case. In Arsenal, the ECJ held that trade mark rights 
constitute an essential component in a system of undistorted 
competition, which the TFEU intends to establish and maintain.233 In 
contrast, in Magill the Court examined the substance of Article 102 and 
intellectual property, notwithstanding its focus on copyright.234 Magill 
involved an Article 102-based action by Independent Television 
Publications, Ltd (ITP), Radio and Television of Ireland (RTE), and the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), seeking to enjoin Magill, 
which allegedly abused its dominant position by publishing a 
comprehensive weekly television guide.235 
In addition to case law such as Arsenal, the legal regime for trade 
marks in the European Union is covered by the Trade Mark Directive 
 
 230. See generally id. ¶¶ 58–59. 
 231. Case C-102/07, Adidas v. Marca and Others, 2008 E.C.R. I-2439, ¶ 35. 
In the present case, it must therefore be determined whether the average consumer, 
when he sees sports or leisure garments featuring stripe motifs in the same places and 
with the same characteristics as the stripes logo registered by Adidas, except for the 
fact that they consist of two rather than three stripes, may be mistaken as to the origin 
of those goods, believing that they are marketed by Adidas AG, Adidas Benelux BV or 
an undertaking linked economically to those undertakings. 
Id. 
 232. Articles 101 and 102 are the main antitrust provisions of the TFEU. Article 102 
regulates abusive conducts “by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market.” TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102. 
 233. Arsenal, 2002 E.C.R. I-10299, ¶ 47. See ¶ 48, where the Court of Justice states “[f]or the 
trade mark to be able to fulfil its essential role in the system of undistorted competition which the 
Treaty seeks to establish and maintain, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods or services 
bearing it have been manufactured or supplied under the control of a single undertaking which is 
responsible for their quality.” 
 234. See generally Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. 
Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-808. 
 235. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. 
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and the CTMR,236 and it is fair to argue that European trade mark law is 
one of the most harmonized branches of law in the Union. The ECJ 
frequently churns out trade mark cases interpreting the Trade Mark 
Directive and the CTMR.237 Under Article 4 of the CTMR, the signs 
that comprise a Community trade mark “[are] any signs capable of 
being represented graphically, particularly words, including personal 
names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their 
packaging, provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the 
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings.”238  
The ECJ confirmed the legal effect of Article 4 in Henkel v. 
OHIM.239 In Henkel, the Court held that based on Article 4, a product’s 
shape and color clearly fall among the signs that may constitute a 
Community trade mark.240 The provisions of Article 7241 of this 
regulation are equally important. In OHIM v. Borco, the Court discusses 
provisions of Article 7(1)(b), which states that trade marks devoid of 
any distinctive character shall not be registered.242 The ECJ dismissed 
 
 236. CTMR, supra note 7; Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14. 
 237. See, e.g., Case C-235/09, DHL Express France SAS v Chronopost SA, 2011 E.C.R. 
____ (delivered Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
text=&docid=81436&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=212
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Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2011 E.C.R. ____ (delivered July 5, 2011), available at http://curia. 
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c=first&part=1&cid=212775; Case C-552/09, Ferrero SpA v. Office for Harmonisation in the 
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available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=80741&pageIndex 
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 238. CTMR, supra note 7, ¶ 4; see also Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, art. 2. 
 239. Joined Cases C-456/01 & C-457/01 P, Henkel KGaA v. Office for Harmonisation in the 
Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2004 E.C.R. I-5115, ¶¶ 30–31. 
 240. Id. ¶ 31. 
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7, art. 7. This list is comparable to the provisions of Article 3 of the Trademark Directive. See 
Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, art. 3. 
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the appeal by the OHIM, however, which claimed that the provisions of 
Article 7(1)(b) had been incorrectly applied.243 The Court applied its 
examination of the distinctive character of a sign based on Article 
7(1)(b).244  
In addition to the Trade Mark Directive and the CTMR, another 
relevant piece of legislation that regulates Community trade marks is the 
IP Enforcement Directive.245 The IP Enforcement Directive lists the 
measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement 
of intellectual property rights.246 These pieces of legislation have a 
common purpose in that they protect the monopoly rights of the trade 
mark owner. Considering this protection, the competition rules set out in 
Article 102 of the TFEU suggest that consumers (or potential market 
entrants) can seek remedies under Article 102 specifically against the 
monopoly rights of trade mark owners.  
A.  Monopoly Rights Conferred by Article 5 of the Trade Mark Directive 
in the Context of Article 102 of the TFEU 
The wording of Article 5 of the Trade Mark Directive, under the 
heading “Rights conferred by a community trade mark,” is a clear signal 
that trade mark rights are monopoly rights. The wording is as follows: 
1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive 
rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third 
parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade: 
(a) any sign which is identical with the Community trade mark in 
relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which 
the Community trade mark is registered; 
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to the 
Community trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or 
services covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a 
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public; the likelihood of 
confusion includes the likelihood of association between the sign and 
the trade mark . . . .247 
It could be deduced from the above provision of the Trade Mark 
Directive that the mere conferral of such exclusive rights provides 
monopoly rights. However, the Magill Court argued that the “mere 
 
 243. BORCO, 2010 E.C.R. ____, ¶ 20. 
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 245. Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
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ownership of an intellectual property right cannot offer such a 
[dominant] position.”248 Nonetheless, the Court said that where the 
appellants enjoy a de facto monopoly over the information used to 
compile listings for television programs they are “thus in a position to 
prevent effective competition on the market in weekly television 
magazines.”249 Thus, like the appellants in Magill, the exclusive rights 
conferred by trade marks are also, arguendo, able to prevent effective 
competition. 
As Judge Friehe-Wich explained in a recent paper, “trade mark law 
is competition law:  like the proprietors of other IP rights, a trade mark 
owner has an exclusive right.”250 There, the learned Judge succinctly 
explained the nexus between trade mark law and competition law: 
The justification for the monopoly rights of the trade mark proprietor 
is that trade mark protection encourages enterprises to produce and 
offer high quality goods that the consumer will recognize because of 
its marking. Other undertakings are excluded from using the same 
trade mark (and from using confusingly similar signs) so that they 
may not exploit the reputation of the producer of the genuine goods 
associated with a desirable, high-quality product.251 
This observation by Judge Friehe-Wich is similar to the view that 
trade marks, unlike other intellectual property rights, “may be 
perpetual, potentially lasting as long as does the underlying 
goodwill.”252 
 What is more potent, however, is the fact that one could further 
argue that trade mark law, though protecting the exclusive rights of the 
owner, is also in fact preserving a monopoly. Indeed, Article 2 of the 
Trade Marks Directive provides that a trade mark must be capable of 
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of 
other undertakings,253 while the eleventh recital in the preamble to the 
Directive states that the functioning of the protection conferred by the 
mark is primarily to guarantee the indication of origin.254 This is crucial 
for the trade mark to fulfill its essential role in the system of undistorted 
competition which the TFEU seeks to establish; “it must offer a 
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guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have originated under 
the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their 
quality.”255 
The problem that arises from interpreting a trade mark as 
guaranteeing origin and preventing undistorted competition is that it 
also creates a new competition issue via the preservation of a monopoly, 
which is prohibited under Article 102 of the TFEU.256 As seen in Sea 
Containers v. Stena, a dominant undertaking, which owns or controls an 
essential facility, refuses to grant access to competitors, and places the 
competitors at a competitive disadvantage, infringes Article 102 of the 
TFEU.257 A product or service that possesses a large market share 
through its trade mark, as the result of heavy marketing, for example, is 
evidence that a dominant position exists. Case law has confirmed that a 
market share of fifty percent is per se evidence of the existence of a 
dominant position.258 As the ECJ explained in Imperial Chemical 
Industry v. Commission, 
[an] undertaking which has a very large market share and holds it for 
some time, by means of the volume of production and the scale of 
the supply which it stands for—without those having much smaller 
market shares being able to meet rapidly the demand from those who 
would like to break away from the undertaking which has the largest 
market share—is by virtue of that share in a position of strength . . . 
which is the special feature of a dominant position.259 
The Imperial Court further said that, a share of between seventy 
percent and eighty percent is, in itself, “a clear indication of the 
existence of a dominant position in the relevant market.”260 Arguendo, 
where a trade mark owner has gained “a very large market share and 
holds it for some time,”261 the proprietor may take steps to prevent a 
competitor from registering similar marks.262 For example, Advocate 
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General Mengozzi, in his recent opinion on Lego Juris,263 argued that 
the monopoly conferred by a trade mark on a product may eliminate 
competition in the market: 
I have accepted that comparing the optional shapes is potentially 
relevant in order to assess the state of competition . . . [and] it makes 
sense in order to determine whether the monopoly conferred by a 
trade mark on a product with certain functional characteristics may 
eliminate competition in the market.264 
Lego Juris A/S appealed the General Court’s judgment of 
November 12, 2008, holding that Lego Juris’s trade mark was 
unenforceable against Mega Brands, their main competitor.265 The issue 
on appeal to the ECJ was whether Lego Juris could register a trade mark 
of “a photographic representation of a typical Lego brick.”266 
The dispute focused on whether the trade mark’s design contained 
“essential characteristics of the shape of the brick.”267 If so, the 
functionality of these characteristics would have to “remain available to 
any toy manufacturer,” therefore prohibiting Lego Juris from registering 
the trade mark.268 
 
1. The following shall not be registered: 
. . . . 
(b) trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character; 
(c) trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may 
serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, intended purpose, value, 
geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the 
service, or other characteristics of the goods or service;  
. . . . 
(e) signs which consist exclusively of: 
(i)   the shape which results from the nature of the goods themselves; 
(ii)  the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result; 
(iii) the shape which gives substantial value to the goods; 
. . . .  
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply notwithstanding that the grounds of non-registrability obtain 
in only part of the Community. 
3. Paragraph 1(b), (c) and (d) shall not apply if the trade mark has become distinctive 
in relation to the goods or services for which registration is requested in consequence 
of the use which has been made of it. 
CMTR, supra note 7, art. 7. 
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Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), available at http://curia. 
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Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2008 E.C.R. II-3117, ¶¶ 91–95. 
 266. Mengozzi Opinion, supra note 263, ¶ 3. 
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On appeal, Lego Juris argued that the General Court infringed 
Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Council Regulation (EC) 40/94 by incorrectly 
interpreting the provision and incorrectly assessing the subject matter of 
the mark.269 According to Lego Juris, Article 7(1)(e)(ii) does not intend 
to “exclude functional shapes per se” from trade mark registration.270 
Rather, Lego Juris argued, the provision turns on “whether trade mark 
protection would create a monopoly on technical solutions or the 
functional characteristics of the shape in question.”271 When the ECJ 
delivered its judgment, however, it said the monopoly issue was 
“outside the scope of these proceedings,” and instead, examined the 
case under the laws of unfair competition.272 
B.  Monopoly in Trade Mark Protection:  Lego and Philips 
The ECJ dismissed the appeal in Lego and upheld the decisions of 
the General Court and the Grand Board of Appeal of the OHIM 
preventing the Lego brick’s being registered as a CTM.273 Lego Juris 
argued the purpose behind Article 7(1)(e)(ii) was to prevent monopolies 
on “technical solutions” or “functional characteristics.”274 Therefore, the 
provision disallows registrations that would “illegitimately restrict 
competitors,” but not all shapes that perform “a technical function.”275 
The ECJ pointed out that “‘technical solution’ should be 
distinguished from the term ‘technical result’ in that a technical result 
can be achieved by various solutions.”276 Therefore, according to the 
ECJ,  
the General Court . . . erred in law when it stated . . . that Article 
7(1)(e)(ii) . . . precludes a shape from registration, even if the 
technical result can be achieved by another shape using the same 
technical solution. . . . The court failed to have regard to the fact that 
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the availability of alternative shapes is highly relevant, since it 
proves that there is no risk of creating a monopoly.277 
Mega Brands, on the other hand, argued that “registration of the 
sign at issue as a trade mark would allow Lego Juris to prevent any 
competitor from using, on the toy-brick market, the best, most 
functional shapes.”278 In this regard, Mega Brands claimed that Lego 
Juris “would regain the monopoly it once enjoyed under its patents.”279  
Furthermore, according to the OHIM, Lego Juris’s 
argument is contrary to the letter and spirit of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) . . . 
[and] the inclusion of the words ‘exclusively’ and ‘necessary’ in that 
provision does not imply that only shapes which are necessary as 
such for the function sought are barred from registration. The ground 
for refusal at issue covers all essentially functional shapes 
attributable to the result.280 
 In addition, the OHIM argued “if the appellant’s argument were 
upheld, competitor’s freedom of access to alternative shapes would not 
be guaranteed.”281 
If a trade mark registration were obtained in respect of a specific 
shape, the appellant could then successfully prevent not only any 
identical shape, but also similar shapes. That would include, for 
example, bricks with slightly higher or wider projections than the 
Lego brick.282 
 
 277. Id. ¶ 31. 
 278. Id. ¶ 33. 
 279. Id. ¶ 33 (“[T]he General Court failed to have regard to the fact, that, often, the same 
patented invention may be created with several shapes.”); see also id. ¶ 34 (“While accepting that 
mere disclosure of a shape in a patent is not by itself a bar to the shape being registered as a trade 
mark, Mega Brands observes that such a disclosure can nevertheless be evidence that the shape is 
indeed functional.”). 
 280. Id. ¶ 35 (“[B]y restricting the ground for refusal set out in Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of 
Regulation No 40/94 to signs which consist ‘exclusively’ of the shape of goods which is 
‘necessary’ to obtain a technical result, the legislature duly took into account that any shape of 
goods is, to a certain extent, functional and that it would therefore be inappropriate to refuse to 
register a shape of goods as a trade mark solely on the ground that it has functional 
characteristics. By the terms ‘exclusively’ and ‘necessary’, that provision ensures that solely 
shapes of goods which only incorporate a technical solution, and whose registration as a trade 
mark would therefore actually impede the use of that technical solution by other undertakings, are 
not to be registered.”); see also Lego II, supra note 269, ¶ 48. 
 281. Id. ¶ 36. 
 282. Id. 
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The ECJ began its analysis in Lego by citing cases such as Arsenal, 
Alcon, and Merz and declaring that trade mark law constitutes an 
essential element of the system of competition in the EU.283 
In that system, each undertaking must, in order to attract and retain 
customers by the quality of its goods or services, be able to have 
registered as trade marks signs enabling the consumer, without any 
possibility of confusion, to distinguish those goods or services from 
others which have another origin.284 
In considering the argument that the provision of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) 
has been interpreted too broadly and incorrectly by the General Court 
and the Grand Board of Appeal, the ECJ said the underlying interest of 
that provision is to prevent trade mark law which grants an undertaking 
monopoly on technical solutions or functional characteristics of a 
product.285 The Court then said 
the inclusion in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 40/94 of the 
prohibition on registration as a trade mark of any sign consisting of 
the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result 
ensures that undertakings may not use trade mark law in order to 
indefinitely perpetuate exclusive rights relating to technical 
solutions.286  
The ECJ concluded that the arguments of Lego Juris, that the 
provisions of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) were interpreted incorrectly, “cannot be 
upheld.”287 
[T]he position of an undertaking which has developed a technical 
solution cannot be protected—with regard to competitors placing on 
the market slavish copies of the product shape incorporating exactly 
the same solution—by conferring a monopoly on that undertaking 
through registering as a trade mark the three-dimensional sign 
consisting of that shape, but can, where appropriate, be examined in 
the light of rules on unfair competition.288 
The ECJ also dismissed Lego Juris’s arguments concerning the 
application of incorrect criteria in the identification of the essential 
 
 283. Id. ¶ 38 (citing Arsenal, 2002 E.C.R. I-10299, ¶¶ 47–48; Case C-412/05 P, Alcon Inc. v. 
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2007 E.C.R. 
I-3569, ¶¶ 53–54; Merz, 2001 E.C.R. I-6959, ¶¶ 21–22). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Lego II, supra note 269, ¶ 43. 
 286. Id. ¶ 45. 
 287. Id. ¶ 62. 
 288. Id. ¶ 61. 
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characteristics of a shape of a mark.289 Instead, the Court said the 
correct application of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) requires that the essential 
characteristics of the three-dimensional sign must be properly identified 
by the authority deciding the application to register the sign as a trade 
mark.290 
Importantly, the Advocate General struck the tone that makes the 
Lego judgment crucial to the argument that trade mark protection 
perpetuates monopolies. The Advocate General observed that the appeal 
was the Court’s second opportunity in ten years to explore the 
intricacies of Article 7(1)(e)(ii), “which justifies the attempt to provide a 
reply which goes beyond the limits imposed by the grounds of the 
appeal.”291 
In Philips v. Remington, which concerned the graphic 
representation of the head shape of an electric razor designed by 
Philips,292 the Court set the tone for what was to come in the Lego 
decision. The Philips case interpreted Articles 3(1),293 3(3),294 5(1),295 
 
 289. Id. ¶ 77. 
 290. Id. ¶ 68. 
 291. Mengozzi Opinion, supra note 263, at ¶ 53. 
 292. Philips, 2002 E.C.R. I-5490, ¶¶ 11–12. 
 293. The Grounds for Refusal or Invalidity under Article 3 of the Trade Mark Directive state, 
in part: 
   The following shall not be registered or, if registered, shall be liable to be declared 
invalid: 
. . . .  
(b) trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character; 
(c) trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in 
trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical 
origin, or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other 
characteristics of the goods or services; 
(d) trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which have become 
customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established practices of the 
trade; 
(e) signs which consist exclusively of: 
   (i)   the shape which results from the nature of the goods themselves; 
   (ii)  the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result; 
   (iii) the shape which gives substantial value to the goods . . . . 
Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, art. 3(1). 
 294. Id. art. 3(3) (“A trade mark shall not be refused registration or be declared invalid in 
accordance with paragraph 1(b), (c) or (d) if, before the date of application for registration and 
following the use which has been made of it, it has acquired a distinctive character. Any Member 
State may in addition provide that this provision shall also apply where the distinctive character 
was acquired after the date of application for registration or after the date of registration.”) 
 295. See id., supra note 14, art. 5(1). 
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and 6(1)(b)296 of the Trade Marks Directive. Similar to Article 7 of the 
CTMR,297 Article 3 of the Trade Marks Directive lists the grounds that a 
trade mark can be refused for invalid registration.298 Philips argued that 
it had acquired a de facto monopoly, and as such, distinctiveness, by 
fulfilling the criterion in Article 3(3) of the Directive. Specifically, 
Philips argued that because of its extensive use of a particular shape, 
both the relevant trade industry and the public at large associate goods 
of that shape with a particular undertaking.299 
The Court was cautious and held that the factual analysis should 
focus on relevant matters in cases involving a monopoly supplier of 
goods.300 In an earlier opinion, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
expressed his skepticism of Philips’ arguments when he said that 
“nothing would stop an undertaking from registering as trade marks all 
imaginable shapes which achieved such a result, thus obtaining a 
permanent monopoly over a particular technical solution.” 301 The U.K., 
as a party to the dispute, also argued “the requirements of Article 3(3) 
are not satisfied where the public’s recognition has come about not 
because of the trade mark but because of the monopoly on the supply of 
the goods.”302 The Commission of the European Communities 
concurred with the U.K.’s reasoning in a similar submission.303 It noted 
that as long as a large portion of the relevant public associate a trade 
mark with a particular undertaking, the requirements of Article 3(3) are 
satisfied regardless of the means of distinction.304 
Moreover, in interpreting Article 3(1)(e) of the Trade Marks 
Directive, the Commission noted that if other shapes readily available to 
competitors can obtain the same technical result, then denying 
registration does not impose unreasonable restraint on industry and 
 
 296. “[I]ndications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, 
geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of the service, or other 
characteristics of goods or services.” Id. art. 6(1)(b). 
 297. CTMR, supra note 7, art. 7. 
 298. See Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, art. 3. 
 299. Philips, 2002 E.C.R. I-5490, ¶ 52 (Philips argued that “a long-standing de facto 
monopoly on products with the relevant shape is important evidence which supports the 
acquisition of distinctiveness. If a trader wishes to base an application for registration upon 
distinctiveness acquired through use, a de facto monopoly is almost a prerequisite for such 
registration.”) 
 300. Id. ¶ 53. 
 301. Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV 
v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-5478, ¶ 39. 
 302. Philips, 2002 E.C.R. I-5490, ¶ 54. 
 303. Id. ¶ 56. 
 304. Id. 
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innovation.305 Philips rebutted this assertion by submitting that the 
purpose of Article 3(1)(e) was to use trade mark protection to prevent 
monopolies.306 The ECJ, however, established the criterion as “the 
availability of alternative shapes to achieve the desired technical result” 
in light of legislative history and its desire to construe exceptions 
narrowly.307 The Court further explained that 
the rationale of the grounds for refusal of registration laid down in 
Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive is to prevent trade mark protection 
from granting its proprietor a monopoly on technical solutions or 
functional characteristics of a product which a user is likely to seek 
in the products of competitors. Article 3(1)(e) is thus intended to 
prevent the protection conferred by the trade mark right from being 
extended, beyond signs which serve to distinguish a product or 
service from those offered by competitors, so as to form an obstacle 
preventing competitors from freely offering for sale products 
incorporating such technical solutions or functional characteristics in 
competition with the proprietor of the trade mark.308 
This reasoning led the Court to conclude that the provisions of 
Article 3(1)(e) “must be interpreted to mean that a sign consisting 
exclusively of the shape of a product is unregistrable by virtue thereof if 
it is established that the essential functional features of that shape are 
attributable only to the technical result.”309 
C.  Further Evidence from the ECJ of Monopoly Rights in Trade Marks 
The remainder of this section further examines some of the other 
cases from the ECJ where the issue of monopoly (market dominance) 
and trade mark goods collided, and considers how the court treated 
these issues within the realm of competition law, in particular Article 
102 of the TFEU. The approach of this article is through the lens of law 
and economics; therefore, it is important to note that monopoly power 
and market power are often used differently by economists and 
lawyers.310 The discussion will begin with the current legal regime for 
 
 305. Id. ¶¶ 66–67. 
 306. Id. ¶ 67. 
 307. Id. ¶ 72. 
 308. Philips, 2002 E.C.R. I-5490, ¶ 78. 
 309. Id. ¶ 84; see also points 1–4 of the ruling. 
 310. For instance, economists use both ‘monopoly power’ and ‘market power’ to refer to the 
power of a single firm or group of firms to price profitably above marginal cost. For a similar 
discussion of the economic meaning of market power and monopoly power, see, e.g., F.M. 
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 14–16 (2d ed. 
1980).  
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monopoly and later explore how the courts often define market 
power.311 
Two sets of legal regulations that mirror the same content serve as 
the most tangible doctrines regulating monopolies, thereby curbing 
market power. These sets of regulations are embedded in Article 102312 
and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.313 To understand the construction of 
market power in the law, one must first understand the legal context in 
which it is shaped. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act deems it illegal to “monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations.”314 
 
 311. For a comparative discussion, see Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization, Abuse of 
Dominance, and the Indeterminacy of Economics:  The U.S./E.U. Divide, 3 UTAH. L. REV. 725 
(2006). 
 312. The Lisbon Treaty was entered into force on 1 December 2009 and several articles, 
including the antitrust provisions, were renumbered (the former Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty are 
now Articles 101 and 102 respectively). See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 17; see also TFEU, 
supra note 19. For the ease of reference this article will use both the prior reference of the EC 
Treaty in addition to the new numbering in the Lisbon Treaty. 
 313. Sherman Antitrust Act, § 2, supra note 46. For instance, in the recent Trinko case the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that firms with market power are not necessarily required to share its 
property with its competitors. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004). The Supreme Court stated that: 
Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that renders them 
uniquely suited to serve their customers. Compelling such firms to share the source of 
their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it 
may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those 
economically beneficial facilities. Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act 
as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—
a role for which they are ill suited. Moreover, compelling negotiation between 
competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antirust:  collusion. 
The Trinko decision arguably reflects the primacy of the incentive theory in justifying intellectual 
property, like prior case law in the United States. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 
(1954), where the Supreme Court explained that: 
“The copyright law, like patent statutes, make reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration.” (Citations omitted.) However, it is “intended definitely to grant 
valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome 
requirements:  ‘to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary [or 
artistic] works of lasting benefit to the world.’” (Citations omitted.) The economic 
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is 
the conviction that . . . [it] is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents 
of authors and inventors in “Science and useful Arts.” Sacrificial days devoted to such 
creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered. 
Id. 
 314. Sherman Antitrust Act, supra note 46, § 2. 
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Under the TFEU any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position will fall afoul of the treaty.315 The requirements of 
Article 102 of the TFEU can be categorized as (a) a dominant position, 
(b) abuse, (c) which affects trade between Member States, (d) in a 
substantial part of the Common Market, and (e) by one or more 
undertakings.316 The first requirement of a dominant position is 
connected to the construction of market power.317 The determination of 
dominance by a firm requires a number of tests, including the definition 
of the relevant market.318 In addition to the relevant market,319 an 
assessment of dominance will also take into account the competitive 
structure of the market, such as expansion, entry, and countervailing 
buying power.320 
The first step in the application of Article 102 is an assessment of 
whether a firm is in a dominant position and the degree of market power 
it holds.321 In United Brands v. Commission of the European 
 
 315. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102. 
 316. Id. 
 317. See Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement 
Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, ¶ 10 [hereinafter Guidance on Article 82]: 
Dominance has been defined under European Community law as a position of 
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking, which enables it to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on a relevant market, by affording it the power to behave 
to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately 
of consumers.  
Id.; see also Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, ¶ 38. Note that 
Article 82 of the TEC has now been renamed Article 102 of the TFEU. See TFEU, supra note 19, 
art. 102. Cf. TEC, supra note 19, art. 82.  
 318. The European Commission, for instance, has issued a Notice on the Definition of 
Relevant Market for the purposes of Community Competition law, which states: 
Market definition is a tool to identify and define the boundaries of competition 
between firms. It serves to establish the framework within which competition policy is 
applied by the Commission. The main purpose of market definition is to identify in a 
systematic way the competitive constraints that the undertakings involved face. The 
objective of defining a market in both its product and geographic dimension is to 
identify those actual competitors of the undertakings involved that are capable of 
constraining their behavior and of preventing them from behaving independently of an 
effective competitive pressure. It is from this perspective, that the market definition 
makes it possible, inter alia, to calculate market shares that would convey meaningful 
information regarding market power for the purposes of assessing dominance or for the 
purposes of applying Article [85]. 
Commission Notice 97/3, 1997 O.J. (372) 1, ¶ 2 (EU). 
 319. Market shares provide a useful first indication for the Commission of the market 
structure and of the relative importance of the various undertakings active on the market. See 
AKZO, 1991 E.C.R. I-3439, ¶ 60; Case T-340/03, Fr. Télécom, 2007 E.C.R. II-107, ¶ 100. 
 320. Guidance on Article 82, supra note 317, ¶ 12. 
 321. Id. ¶ 9. 
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Communities, the ECJ defined “dominance” as “a position of economic 
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.”322 
Various case law has also shown that a dominant position derives 
from a combination of several factors which, taken separately, are not 
necessarily determinative.323 This is particularly apparent in examining 
the relevant markets for medicinal pharmaceutical products. 
1.  Lelos v. Glaxo:  Abuse of Dominance Under Article 102 
This section will discuss the recent Lelos v. Glaxo judgment by the 
ECJ regarding the interpretation of Article 102 of the TFEU.324 On 
September 16, 2008, the ECJ held that Article 102 must be interpreted 
as meaning that an undertaking occupying a dominant position on the 
relevant market for medicinal products is abusing its dominant position 
if it refuses to meet the ordinary orders by wholesalers in order to 
prevent parallel exports. 325 
i.  The main question referred to the court and surrounding facts 
The Greek courts asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on 
whether or not it is an abuse of a dominant position in violation of 
Article 102 for a pharmaceuticals company occupying such a position 
on the national market to refuse to fill orders by wholesalers who are 
engaged in parallel exports.326 The facts surrounding the case involved 
the Greek subsidiary of GlaxoSmithKline plc, GSK AEVE which 
imports, warehouses, and distributes pharmaceutical products of the 
GSK group in Greece. It also holds “the marketing authorization in 
Greece” for the medicinal products involved in the dispute.327  
The other applicants to the dispute had for a number of years 
bought those medicinal products from GSK AEVE for local distribution 
 
 322. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207, ¶ 65. 
 323. See, e.g., Case C-250/92, Gøttrup-Klim Grovvareforening v. Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab AmbA (DLG), 1994 E.C.R. I-5671, ¶ 47. 
 324. See generally Joined Cases C-468 & C-478/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE v. 
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proïonton, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139. 
 325. See also Press Release No. 65/08, Judgment of the Court of Justice in Cases C-468/06 to 
C-478/06 (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/ 
2009-03/cp080065en.pdf. 
 326. Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 28. 
 327. Id. ¶ 9. 
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and export to other Member States of the EU.328 Towards the end of 
October 2000, GSK AEVE altered its system of distribution in the 
Greek market, citing a shortage of the medicinal products in the dispute. 
From November 6, 2000, GSK AEVE stopped meeting the orders of the 
appellants and began to distribute those products to Greek hospitals and 
pharmacies through the company Farmacenter AE.329 Lelos, its co-
applicants, and other Greek pharmaceutical wholesalers applied to the 
Greek Competition Commission for a declaration that the sales policy of 
GSK AEVE and its parent company in respect of the medicinal products 
constituted an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 and 
corresponding Greek antitrust laws.330 
The Greek Competition Commission issued an interim ruling on 
August 3, 2001, that GSK AEVE should meet the orders of the 
applicants for medicinal products pending a final decision.331 However, 
GSK AEVE lodged an application with the Administrative Appeal 
Court for a stay of execution and an annulment of that decision.332 The 
court rejected the application.333  
The Greek Court of First Instance in the Lelos v. Glaxo saga, held 
in 2003 that GSK AEVE’s refusal to supply was justified and could not 
constitute an abuse of its dominant position.334 The case was appealed to 
the Court of Appeal in Athens, which then referred it to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling.335 Before the ECJ ruling, the Greek Competition 
Commission on September 6, 2006, ruled that GSK AEVE did not 
occupy a dominant position on the market for two of its medicinal 
products but found it did hold a dominant position for one.336 
 
 328. Id. ¶ 10. Co-applicants to the dispute were Farmakemporiki AE Emporias kai Dianomis 
Farmakeftikon Proionton (C-469/06); Konstantinos Xidias kai Sia OE (C-470/06); 
Farmakemporiki AE Emporias kai Dianomis Farmakeftikon Proionton (C-471/06); Ionas 
Stroumsas EPE (C-472/06); Ionas Stroumsas EPE (C-473/06); Farmakemporiki Farma-Group 
Messinias AE (C-474/06); K.P. Marinopoulos AE Emporias kai Dianomis Farmakeftikon 
Proionton (C-475/06); K.P. Marinopoulos AE Emporias kai Dianomis Farmakeftikon Proionton 
(C-476/06); Kokkoris D. Tsanas K. EPE and Others (C-477/06); Kokkoris D. Tsanas K. EPE and 
Others (C-478/06) listed in Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139. 
 329. Id. ¶ 11. 
 330. The corresponding provision of Article 82 in Greek law was laid down in Diatagma 
(1977:703) Peri elegxoymonopwliwn kai oligopwliwn kai prostasias toy eleygerry antagwnismoy 
[On Monopolies and Oligopolies Control and Protection of Free Competition] Government 
Gazette [FEK A’] 1977, A:278 (Greece). 
 331. Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 16. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. ¶ 20. 
 335. Id. ¶ 23. 
 336. Id. ¶ 24. 
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ii.  Market power in pharmaceuticals:  The law and economics of a 
refusal to supply as analyzed in Lelos v. Glaxo 
There are few cases involving intellectual property rights and the 
abuse of dominance in the EU.337 Lelos v. Glaxo did not depart from the 
established case law on abuse of dominance. The existence of a 
dominant position is one of the key requirements for a violation of 
Article 102 of the TFEU.338 In Lelos v. Glaxo, the ECJ cited its own 
case law and explained that a refusal to supply by an undertaking with a 
dominant position on the market of a given product constitutes an abuse 
of dominance under Article 102 of the TFEU.339 
In a style typical of the ECJ, the Court addressed the issue in two 
parts. The first issue was whether such behavior constituted a refusal to 
supply, liable to eliminate competition. If so, the second issue was 
whether the refusal to supply was abusive.340 The court stressed the 
entrenched case law and observed that a dominant undertaking’s refusal 
to meet the orders of an existing customer, without objective 
justification, is abusive if that conduct is liable to eliminate a 
competitor.341 
The court further observed that though a firm has a legitimate right 
to protect its commercial interest, if it is attacked, “such behaviour 
cannot be accepted if its purpose is specifically to strengthen the 
dominant position and abuse it.”342 The ECJ in Lelos v. Glaxo gradually, 
and in line with the Guidance on the Application of Article 82 
(Guidance on Article 82),343 attempted to apply a more economics 
effects-based approach to its case law.344 The Guidance on Article 82 
 
 337. See generally  Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. 
Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-808; Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health 
GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039; Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601. 
 338. Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 49. 
 339. See, e.g., Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Commission, 
1974 E.C.R. 223, ¶ 25 [hereinafter Commercial Solvents] and United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 
¶ 183. 
 340. Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 34. 
 341. Id. (citing Commercial Solvents, 1974 E.C.R. 223, ¶ 25 and United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 
207, ¶ 183). 
 342. Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 50; see also United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207, ¶ 189. 
 343. See Guidance on Article 82, supra note 317. Article 82 under the old Treaty is now 
Article 102 of the TFEU. Id. 
 344. The economics or effects-based approach to Article 102 stemmed from a 2005 report, 
which the Commission published, that called for a more effects-based approach to case law. The 
report argued in favor of an economics-based approach to Article 82 (now Article 102), similar to 
the reform of Article 81 (now Article 101) and merger control. See ECON. ADVISORY GRP. FOR 
COMPETITION POLICY, AN ECONOMICS APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82, 2 (2005) [hereinafter 
EAGCP REPORT]. The thinking was that an economics-based approach, according to the report, 
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ushered in an increased degree of legal clarity with regard to the 
analytical framework of dominant firms’ conduct under Article 102 of 
the TFEU.345 In Lelos v. Glaxo, however, the application of economic 
effect was ambiguous, leaving room for further interpretation and 
clearer application of economic analysis. In fact, the court did not apply 
substantive economic arguments to its ruling or utilize any 
comprehensive survey regarding the market share of the GSK Group. 
The closest mention by the Court of the overall market share, and 
thus market power, was the agreement by GSK AEVE following 
discussions with the Greek Competition Commission to “deliver 
quantities of medicines equivalent to national consumption plus 
18%.”346 In addition, the Greek National Organization for Medicines 
published a circular on November 27, 2001, which compelled 
pharmaceutical companies and all distributors of medicines to deliver 
the equivalent of those required for prescription medicines plus twenty-
five percent.347 The ECJ took these economic factors into consideration, 
however the court did not perform sufficient economic analysis, 
especially in light of the Guidance on Article 82. 
 
“will naturally lend itself to a rule of reason approach to competition policy, since careful 
consideration of the specifics of each case is needed, and this is likely to be especially difficult 
under per se rules.” (internal quotations omitted). EAGCP REPORT, at 3. On December 19, 2005, 
the European Commission published a discussion paper on the application of Article 82 to 
exclusionary abuses, which covered, inter alia, the assessment of dominance, a framework for 
analysis of exclusionary abuses, and a proposed individual approach to each of the four main 
types of exclusionary abuse. See DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 
82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses (Dec. 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf. Following the consultations in February 2009, the Commission 
published a guidance on the application of Article 82, to which the courts have since turned when 
assessing violations under Article 82. See Guidance on Article 82, supra note 317. Guidance on 
Article 82 covers the application of Article 82 to exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, 
which addresses specific abuses such as exclusive dealing, tying and bundling, predation, refusal 
to supply, and margin squeeze. Id. For criticisms of Guidance on Article 82, see, e.g., John 
Temple Lang, Article 82 EC—The Problems and the Solution 6–23 (Aug. 27, 2009), available at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/54282/2/65-09.pdf; Case C-95/04 P, British Airways plc 
v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, ¶ 69 (The judgment states that there is a need to examine 
“whether there is an objective economic justification for the discounts and bonuses granted.”). 
 345. The Guidance on Article 82 states,  
[a]longside the Commission’s specific enforcement decisions, it is intended to provide 
greater clarity and predictability as regards the general framework of analysis which 
the Commission employs in determining whether it should pursue cases concerning 
various forms of exclusionary conduct and to help undertakings better assess whether 
certain behavior is likely to result in intervention by the Commission under Article 82. 
Guidance on Article 2, supra note 317, ¶ 2. 
 346. Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 14. 
 347. Id. ¶ 17. 
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iii.   Lelos v. Glaxo:  The ECJ’s old religion 
Lelos v. Glaxo was an important case that the ECJ decided during 
the reform process of Article 102.348 As shown above, the reform 
process of Article 102 advocates a more effects-based approach to 
proceedings involving Article 102, but the case was decided using the 
same old per se approach. That is, the court used the form-based 
approach and did not employ the rule of reason approach in any 
substantive way.349 The court stuck to what it believed to be best, its old 
religion of form-based approach, rather than ushering in the effects-
based approach with extensive economic analysis. 
This approach by the ECJ suggests that the law on abuse of market 
power is far from settled.350 One may argue that analyses, which rely on 
qualitative and quantitative evidence, such as one assessing harm to the 
consumer, are time-consuming. If the goal of the court was for the 
tenets of the Article 102 reform to be taken seriously, however, it failed 
to do so. The ECJ in Lelos v. Glaxo did not use empirical arguments, 
which could have utilized a more effects-based approach in line with the 
Guidance on Article 82.351 
2.  AstraZeneca:  Trade Mark Branding and Market Entry 
Can antitrust rules be flouted in order to keep a competitor off the 
market for generic drugs? In short, the answer is yes. With innovative 
branding and abuse of a dominant position, a patent holder may be able 
to achieve such a goal. This was seen in AstraZeneca, regarding 
Omeprazole, marketed as Prilosec and Losec.352 “Brands, and by 
 
 348. Frances Murphy & Francesco Liberatore, The European Commission’s Guidance on the 
Application of Article 82 EC (Jun. 25, 2009), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article. 
asp?id=6883&nid=6. Several cases and Commission decisions on Article 82 were decided since 
the Commission’s discussion paper was published and leading up to the adoption of the Guidance 
on Article 82. See, e.g., Case T-340/03, Fr. Télécom v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-107; 
Summary of Commission Decision of 11 October 2007 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/B-1/37.966—Distrigaz), 2008 O.J. (C 9) 5. 
 349. For a discussion on the rule of reason approach, see, e.g., Claudia Desogus, Parallel 
Trade and Pharmaceutical R&D:  The Pitfalls of the Rule of Reason, 29 EUR. COMPETITION L. 
REV. 649 (2008). 
 350. For more on this, see, e.g., John Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115 ECON. J. F244, 
F248 (2005). 
 351. See also EAGCP REPORT, supra note 344, at 13 (stating that effects-based approach 
requires the verification of competitive harm). 
 352. See generally Case T-321/05, AstraZeneca AB v. Commission, 2010 E.C.R. ____ 
(delivered July 1, 2010), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=& 
docid=82135&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=149187 
[hereinafter AstraZeneca]. The General Court’s decision concerns the Commission decision of 
June 2005 that imposed a fine of €60 million on AstraZeneca for misusing the patent and the 
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extension trademarks, . . . are an important weapon in the arsenal of 
competition,” because they can promote competitiveness and cause 
competition infringements.353 The legal definition of a trade mark was 
discussed above,354 and as Lopes and Duguid observe, “[a] trademark is 
then that aspect of the brand that can gain legal protection through 
registration.”355 Despite a broad approach to the concept of a brand356 
(and trade marks),357 Lopes and Duguid acknowledge “brands, as a kind 
of monopoly, can distort markets, inhibit innovation, provide 
unreasonable barriers to entry, and promote rent-seeking behaviour.”358  
Despite anti-competitive functions of brands, it is not necessarily 
the case that that they are addressed by either competition law or trade 
mark law. Both trade mark law and competition law address business 
competition. As a recent paper points out:  “[O]ne might expect [trade 
mark and competition law] to address brands as they fit into each 
doctrine’s areas of concern and that together trademark and antitrust law 
would offer a coherent legal regime to manage the way in which brands 
affect competition.”359 Desai and Waller submit that “trademark law 
fails to recognize that trademarks are only a subset of a business’ 
broader brand strategy in the real world.”360 
 
procedures for marketing pharmaceutical products to prevent or delay the market entry of 
competing medicinal products. Id. ¶¶ 1–9. See Press Release, Competition:  Commission Fines 
AstraZeneca €60 Million for Misusing Patent System to Delay Market Entry of Competing 
Generic Drugs, IP/05/737 (June 15, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases 
Action.do?reference=IP/05/737 [hereinafter Commission Press Release]. 
 353. TRADEMARKS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITIVENESS 1 (Teresa da Silva Lopes & Paul 
Duguid eds., 2010). The authors argue that the general definition of a brand as a name, term, 
symbol, or design (or combination of these) is “used by a firm to identify its goods or services 
and differentiate them from the competition.” Id. 
 354. See CTMR, supra note 7, art. 4. 
 355. TRADEMARKS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 353 at 1. 
 356. See, e.g., Desai & Waller, supra note 79, at 1449 (“Brands are complex strategic tools 
that perform a variety of functions including creating demand, circumventing middlemen so that a 
company can reach consumers directly, controlling prices, managing quality, providing a 
platform for trademark enforcement, defining national identities, and satisfying a consumer’s 
emotional and psychological needs. These functions, separately and in combination, allow a 
company to differentiate products, avoid commoditization of its products or services, and 
distinguish the company and its goods or services from its competition, thus building loyal 
customer bases for whom no other brand or item will suffice.”) 
 357. See, e.g., TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE (Lionel 
Bently, Jennifer Davis & Jane C. Ginsburg eds. 2008) xv. 
 358. TRADEMARKS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 353 at 1. 
 359. Desai & Waller, supra note 79, at 1425–26.  
 360. Id. at 1428. Desai and Waller further argue that a successful brand encompasses more 
than a source and quality functions. They contend that “trademark law is incomplete” because it 
“regulates only a fraction” of the real business behavior that matters, and the claimed “protection 
for a mark, first subtly . . . has transformed into protection for a brand.” Id. at 1429. 
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When the General Court upheld a decision by the European 
Commission361 that AstraZeneca was abusing its dominant position by 
adopting strategies designed to delay or limit generic entry,362 the court 
said that though the “abuse is novel,” such practices were “manifestly 
contrary to competition on the merits.”363 
Clearly, therefore, lurking between the lines in this judgment were 
concerns about the branding of a drug, widely known on the European 
markets as Losec,364 by AstraZeneca with the use of “novel” strategies 
that were limiting competitors’ entry into the relevant generic drug 
market and infringing Article 102 of the TFEU.365 AstraZeneca blocked 
or delayed parallel imports and generic entry to a number of markets in 
the EU and the European Economic Area and thus abused its dominance 
in the proton pump inhibitor (PPI), the relevant product market.366  
A fine was imposed on AstraZeneca, which it appealed in 
September 2005.367 An oral hearing took place before the Sixth 
Chamber of the General Court on November 26 and 27, 2008, when the 
 
 361. Commission Press Release, supra note 352. The fine imposed on AstraZeneca was for 
two abuses of a dominant position contrary to Article 102 TFEU. 
 362. The first abuse was that AstraZeneca engaged in a pattern of deliberate 
misrepresentation to national courts and patent offices in order to obtain SPC for Losec 
(omeprazole), between 1993 and 2000, the so called SPC abuse. The second abuse was that in 
1998/1999, AstraZeneca operated a strategy of selectively withdrawing its Losec capsules, 
replacing them with Losec tablets, and requesting deregistration of the marketing authorizations 
for the capsules in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the so called “deregistration abuse.” See 
AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 8.  
 363. Id. ¶ 901.  
 364. The active substance in Losec is omeprazole, a proton pump inhibitor (PPI) used in 
treating gastro-intestinal acid-related conditions. Id. ¶ 62. 
 365. Id. ¶ 7. The first alleged abuse consisted of a pattern of allegedly misleading 
representations made before the patent offices in a number of European countries in which 
AstraZeneca operates and the national Courts in Germany and Norway. The second alleged 
abused consisted of the submission for requests for deregistration of the marketing authorizations 
for Losec capsules in Scandinavia, combined with the withdrawal from the market of Losec 
capsules and the launch of Losec MUPS tablets in those territories. See id. ¶ 8. 
 366. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 70–71. The court upheld the Commission’s finding of 
national markets for PPI’s, stating, “[The] finding is to a large extent supported by the statements 
of the medical experts submitted by the applicants during the administrative procedure . . . that 
PPIs were generally used to treat the severe forms of the conditions while H2 blockers were 
reserved more for their milder forms.” The General Court further explained that PPIs and H2 
blockers were prescribed to treat the same conditions and that both constituted first-line 
treatments. See id. ¶ 151. 
 367. Id. ¶ 10. See also Commission Decision 332/24, 2006 O.J. (L 857) 2 (EC). The 60 
million euro fine was reduced by the General Court because the Commission had failed to 
establish that deregistration of the Losec capsule marketing authorization was capable of 
restricting parallel imports of Losec capsules. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶¶ 865, 920.2. 
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parties presented oral arguments.368 The General Court, after an 
extensive analysis of the case, essentially summed up its arguments by 
stating that AstraZeneca cannot 
use regulatory procedures in such a way as to prevent or make more 
difficult the entry of competitors on the market, in the absence of 
grounds relating to the defense of the legitimate interests of an 
undertaking engaged in competition on the merits or in the absence 
of objective justification.369 
The General Court acknowledged that “brand loyalty” derives from 
“past reputation or advertising.”370 
In the background of this decision was the fact that the burden of 
proof was on the Commission to demonstrate that AstraZeneca was in a 
dominant position by examining the relevant product market, which was 
constituted of AstraZeneca’s PPIs.371 The court said that doctors’ 
prescribing practice was characterized by a certain “inertia,” and the 
applicants argued that in the pharmaceutical sector, competition takes 
place primarily at the level of innovation rather than at the level of 
price.372 Thus, it was the Commission in its arguments that 
acknowledged that the “inertia” of the prescribing practice is an 
exogenous characteristic of the market, unrelated to competition on 
the merits, which autonomously dampens demand for a new product. 
Thus, ‘inertia’ on the part of prescribing doctors cannot be regarded 
as a competitive constraint imposed by H2 blockers, akin to brand 
loyalty generated by past reputation or advertising.373 
The reference to H2 blockers is part of the dispute regarding the 
definition of the relevant product market and the competitive interaction 
of H2 blockers (also known as ‘antihistamines’) with PPIs. 374 The 
Court was more succinct about Losec’s brand image:  “Losec enjoyed a 
 
 368. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 19. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Industries and Associations (EFPIA) intervened in the dispute. Id. ¶ 21. 
 369. Id. ¶ 672. 
 370. Id. ¶ 56. 
 371. Id. ¶ 28. See also Commission Notice 97/3, 1997 O.J. (372) ¶¶ 1–6 (EU). As the court 
said, for the purposes of investigating the possibly dominant position of an undertaking, the 
possibilities of competition must be judged in the context of the market comprising the totality of 
the products. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 31. To this effect the court cited, for example, Case 
T-219/99, British Airways v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917. Id. ¶ 91. 
 372. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶¶ 34, 41. 
 373. Id. ¶ 56. 
 374. See id. ¶ 62 for a full description. 
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solid brand image and reputation on account of its status of ‘first 
product on the market,’ and had the most experience behind it.”375 
Furthermore, in establishing the factual context of the second 
abuse of a dominant position identified by the Commission, the court 
cited documents which identified “key actions to minimize sales erosion 
following patent expiry” and develop “products with significant medical 
benefits/differential to compete with cheap generic omeprazole . . . and 
to retain price and volume.”376 The court explained that “[the] 
diversification of the brand before patent expiry is intended to protect 
sales in the short- to medium-term after that expiry through customer 
loyalty/use habits in the absence of similar generic products.”377 
Another internal document stated that the switch from capsules to 
tablets would “vitalise the Losec brand” and that the switch was 
“intended to increase the protection of the . . . brand ([against] future 
generics) and make the brand more competitive.”378 Nonetheless, the 
court found 
no reason to reproach [AstraZeneca] either for launching Losec 
[tablets] or for withdrawing Losec capsules from the market, since 
those acts were not such to raise the legal barriers to entry 
complained of by the Commission that were capable of delaying or 
preventing the introduction of generic products and parallel 
imports.379 
The reference to brand loyalty by the ECJ380 is a subtle reference to 
AstraZeneca’s use of umbrella branding381 to move ahead of its 
competitors and to gain doctors’ reliance on Losec’s “solid brand 
image.”382 Umbrella branding—“the practice of selling several products 
under the same brand name”383—is used widely within several 
 
 375. Id. ¶ 278. 
 376. Id. ¶ 762. 
 377. Id. ¶ 763. 
 378. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 775. 
 379. Id. ¶ 811. 
 380. Id. ¶ 56. 
 381. See CHINMAYA PADHI, ET AL., BUSINESS INSIGHTS, THE OTC OUTLOOK FOR 2007 
(2003) 116, 138, available at http://www.globalbusinessinsights.com/rbi/content/rbhc0090t.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2012); Luís M.B. Cabral, Umbrella Branding with Imperfect Observability 
and Moral Hazard, 27 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 206, 206 (2009). The terms ‘brand stretching’ and 
‘brand extension’ are used often in the literature. For more discussions on umbrella branding, see, 
for example, Chong Ju Choi & Carlo Scarpa, Credible Spatial Preemption Through Reputation 
Extension, 10 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 439, 440 (1992); Fredrik Andersson, Pooling Reputations, 20 
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 715, 719 (2002). 
 382. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 278. 
 383. Jeanine Miklós-Thal, Linking Reputations Through Umbrella Branding 1 (Nov. 4, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative 
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industries, as it allows firms “to leverage brand equity”384 and as such, 
“helps firms with strong brands to successfully introduce new products 
by convincing consumers that new and existing products are of similar 
quality.”385 Therefore, because Losec enjoyed a “solid brand image and 
reputation”386 the use of umbrella branding by AstraZeneca helped to 
portray the quality of the new generic product and may have contributed 
to “inertia” by prescribing doctors.387 Jeanine Miklós-Thal points out, 
that as “firms can condition their branding decisions on qualities, 
umbrella branding can convey information to consumers even in the 
absence of any technological quality correlation.”388 
The effect of umbrella branding is that it creates a “signaling 
effect” and a “feedback effect,”389 arguably fostering a sense of 
“loyalty” and “lock-in” effects on the consumer. The implication of the 
lock-in effects is that it distorts competition by creating a brand, and by 
extension a trade mark, that constitutes a monopoly. 
The General Court in its judgment confirmed that 
misrepresentations by a dominant company before public authorities, 
such as patent offices and national courts, which lead to the grant of an 
exclusive right not entitled by an undertaking, or entitled for a shorter 
period, “may be particularly restrictive of competition” and may 
constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 102.390 The General 
Court further confirmed that a dominant company cannot use regulatory 
procedures to prevent the entry of competitors into the market, 
irrespective of its compliance or non-compliance with other legal 
rules.391 
The AstraZeneca decision is important for intellectual property 
rights, as it demonstrates that the holders of intellectual property rights 
can be held liable for violating the competition rules under Article 102. 
The decision further provides guidance as to when raising legal barriers 
that are capable of delaying or preventing the introduction of generic 
 
Law Review) (citing DAVID A. AAKER, BRAND PORTFOLIO STRATEGY:  CREATING RELEVANCE, 
DIFFERENTIATION, ENERGY, LEVERAGE, AND CLARITY xiii (2004)). See also Hendrik Hakenes & 
Martin Peitz, Umbrella Branding and the Provision of Quality, 26 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 546, 546 
(2008). 
 384. Id. at 24. 
 385. Id. at 1. 
 386. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 278. 
 387. Id. ¶¶ 34, 41. 
 388. Miklós-Thal, supra note 383, at 2. 
 389. Id. 
 390. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 355. 
 391. Id. ¶¶ 656, 677 (stating “[t]he illegality of abusive conduct under Article [102 TFEU] is 
unrelated to its compliance or non-compliance with other legal rules”). 
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products or parallel trade will constitute abusive conduct and a breach 
of Article 102 of the TFEU. 
VI.  TRADE MARK MONOPOLIES, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, AND 
ANTITRUST LAW 
The enactment of antitrust law is seen as a way of curbing and 
breaking up monopolies that have significant market share and abuse 
their market power. Intellectual property rights confer exclusive rights 
on their owners.392 Yet different types of intellectual property pursue 
different goals and may produce different effects on the market. For 
instance, trade marks and copyrights pursue different goals from each 
other,393 and in doing so, they employ different legal mechanisms to 
reach these goals.394 The same can be said of patent law, which 
promotes innovation.395 Professor Mark Lemley has argued that 
intellectual property rights are exclusive and indefinite, and as such, 
they confer market power.396 This has always been the view of the 
courts, and thus an abuse of market power is a violation of antitrust 
law.397 
Trade mark protection is not exempt from antitrust law since it is 
“one of those monopolies,”398 yet one of the aims of trade mark law is 
to protect consumers from confusion and ultimately enhance 
competition in the market place.399 The infinite nature of trade mark 
protection may affect antitrust law when it prevents competitors from 
 
 392. Professor Mark Lemley has argued that 
in economic terms, intellectual property rights prevent competition in the sale of a 
particular work or invention covered by the intellectual property right, and therefore 
allow the intellectual property owner to raise the price of that work above the marginal 
cost of reproducing it . . . . In many cases fewer people will buy the work than if it 
were distributed on a competitive basis, and they will pay more for the privilege.  
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
989, 996 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of Improvement]. 
 393. Copyright for example, “allows its owner to exploit ideas once they have been expressed 
and recorded in a work, and provides the means for allocating the risks of doing so.” COLSTON & 
MIDDLETON, supra note 132, at 279. 
 394. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 76, at 29. 
 395. FED. TRADE COMM’N TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (2003) 
 396. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 392, at 992. 
 397. See Sherman Antitrust Act § 2. 
 398. Blanchard, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. at 693 (2 ATK 484–85). 
 399. See, e.g., H.R. rep. No. 76-944, at 3 (1939), stating that, “[t]he public is thus assured of 
identity, and is given an opportunity to choose between competing articles. To protect trade-
marks, i.e., marks which permit the goods of different makers to be distinguished from each 
other, is to promote competition . . .”. 
  
2011] The Economics of Distinctiveness 381 
engaging in any attempt to reproduce a successful mark or packaging 
design.400 
Economic theory tells us that public goods are those goods and 
services a number of individuals are able to consume without affecting 
the value of such goods and services.401 Furthermore, public goods are 
not only those goods that are publicly provided by governments, but 
public goods can also be provided by private means.402 Most forms of 
intellectual property protection are filed by private individuals and 
corporations and are provided as a form of ‘public goods.’ The modern 
theoretical foundation for other forms of intellectual property rights, 
such as patents and copyrights, were based on a public goods theory.403 
As Professor David Barnes points out, 
[p]ublic goods analysis is . . . an emerging approach to trademark 
law issues. . . . [The] characteristics of public goods mean, 
respectively, that information once created can be simultaneously 
enjoyed by many people without interfering with the benefits each 
derives and that it is difficult to exclude people from enjoying those 
benefits.404 
The relevance of the public goods theory is that in relation to trade 
mark, public goods inherently contain a normative argument, for 
example, in relation to antitrust.405 
The trouble with antitrust is that the concept of market power has 
to be properly defined in the law. The Guidance on Article 82 and the 
case law of the ECJ state that dominance is when a firm enjoys 
economic strength.406 If a firm has a low market share, then that firm 
may not run afoul of the antitrust laws in Europe since “low market 
shares are generally a good proxy for the absence of substantial market 
power.”407 Furthermore, according to the European Commission, 
“experience suggests that dominance is not likely if the undertaking’s 
 
 400. See Besen & Raskind, supra note 78, at 21. See also Kurt Borchardt, Are Trademarks an 
Antitrust Problem?, 31 GEO. L.J. 245, 246 (1943). 
 401. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 76, at 24. 
 402. RAYMOND G. BATINA & TOSHIHIRO IHORI, PUBLIC GOODS:  THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 
2 (2005). 
 403. See Barnes, supra note 76, at 22–23. 
 404. David W. Barnes, Trademark Externalities, 10 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1, 22 (2007). 
 405. A discussion on public goods theory and intellectual property (trademarks) is beyond the 
scope of this paper, and is taken up elsewhere; however, see also DINA KALLAY, THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  AN AUSTRIAN APPROACH 56 
(2004). 
 406. Guidance on Article 82, supra note 317, ¶ 10; See, e.g., United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 
207, ¶ 66. 
 407. Guidance on Article 82, supra note 317, ¶ 14. 
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market share is below 40% in the relevant market.”408 Recall that 
Article 102 of the TFEU and Section 2 of the Sherman Act apply to 
dominance or monopoly. The applicability of those two laws is 
significant since there are two elements in a monopoly:  “[the] 
possession of monopoly power [and] the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen 
or historic accident.”409 
Thus, the Sherman Act applies to both the possession of a 
monopoly and to attempts to monopolize.410 On the other hand, EU case 
law has defined dominance as the power “to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on the relevant market.”411 Therefore, the 
concept of dominance in both the EU and the United States becomes 
relevant when a certain degree of economic power is involved. Market 
power arises out of the concept of dominance, and the Guidance on 
Article 82 states that, “[t]he assessment of whether an undertaking is in 
a dominant position and of the degree of market power it holds is a first 
step in the application of Article 82.”412 The Guidance on Article 82 
adds that “[a]ccording to the case-law, holding a dominant position 
confers a special responsibility on the undertaking concerned, the scope 
of which must be considered in the light of the specific circumstances of 
each case”413 meaning any assessment must be carried out on a case by 
case basis. 
The Guidance on Article 82 further states that from experience, a 
firm that enjoys less than forty percent market share is not in a dominant 
position.414 This approach to the definition of market power (the 
Guidance on Article 82 mentions only market share) appears to contain 
flaws and “should be evaluated in the context of the alleged 
 
 408. Id. 
 409. See Vickers, supra note 350, at F247 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 
563, 570–71 (1966)). Vickers further explained the distinction between U.S. and EU Law on 
dominance: 
Note that in the US, the law is engaged only if there is a causal link from the conduct to 
the market power. By contrast, though Article 82 applies only if there is market 
power—to the extent of dominance—conduct can be abusive even if it does not 
maintain or strengthen that power. So in Europe, but not in the US, pure exploitation of 
market power—e.g. excessive pricing—can breach competition law. 
Id. 
 410. Id. 
 411. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207, ¶ 65; see also Centrafarm, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, ¶ 10 
(reasoning that abusing a dominant position is a violation of Article 86). 
 412. Guidance on Article 82, supra note 317, ¶ 9. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. ¶ 14. 
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anticompetitive conduct and effect.”415 By using a threshold to analyze 
market power, there is a risk of ignoring other important market 
information, such as the ability of competing firms to expand. 
The trouble with trade mark protection is that it grants exclusive 
and absolute power.416 These powers are rooted in legal protection, 
which serve as an incentive to innovate (though an incentive to invest 
might be more appropriate in this context since trade mark law does not 
provide any incentive to create new marks). As discussed above, the 
present body of work on trade marks generally states that the main 
benefit of trade mark protection is that it lowers the consumer’s search 
cost.417 Although this “economic argument for protecting marks is 
straightforward and quite forceful,”418 the exclusivity and absoluteness 
of trade marks breed monopolies which are inherently in conflict with 
antitrust law.419 Strong trade marks then effectively lead to monopoly 
profits due to the ability of the trade mark owner to influence the 
consumer.420 The monopoly created by trade mark protection and excess 
market power presents flaws, which are “at odds with social welfare.”421 
Therefore, the purpose of trade marks should be “simply to help identify 
goods accurately to consumers, so that they may obtain the precise 
price/quality mix they desire.”422 
 
 415. See Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at 
the Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 187, 191 (2000) (stating that “[m]arket definition and market 
power should be evaluated in the context of the alleged anticompetitive conduct and effect, not as 
a flawed filter carried out in a vacuum divorced from these factors.”). 
 416. See Fletcher, supra note 91, at 323 (citing UPTON, supra note 70, at 10); cf. Marcia B. 
Paul & Anthony F. Lo Cicero, Litigating Trademark and Unfair Competition Cases, 463 PLI/Pat 
83, 118–19 (delineating four categories of trademark protection from per se exclusive protection, 
to conditional protections, to no protection) (1996). 
 417. See, e.g., Png & Reitman, supra note 122, at 208–11. 
 418. Carter, supra note 80, at 762.  
 419. Fletcher, supra note 91, at 323. 
 420. For similar arguments, see, e.g., Charles E. Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Power:  A 
Phenomenon Called “Product Differentiation”, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 4–9 (1968). Cf. 1 
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 4:54 (4th ed. 2010) 
(explaining why “there is no real conflict . . . between the antitrust laws on the one hand and 
trademark laws on the other”). See also Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Competition:  The 
Recent History, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1996, at 13 (highlighting the current trend of 
trademark protection’s and antitrust law’s being “perfectly compatible”). 
 421. Lunney, Jr., supra note 120, at 373. 
 422. Id. at 461. Lunney, Jr. concluded by stating that “[b]y creating market power and 
anticompetitive losses without offsetting efficiency advantages, property-based trademark 
protection fully deserves the label ‘trademark monopoly.’” Id. at 487. 
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“Product differentiation423 refers to such variations within a 
product class that some consumers view as imperfect substitutes.”424 
The economic literature, for instance, tells us that what differentiates 
products are the characteristics that they each possess.425 Hence, product 
differentiation involves making a particular firm’s product either 
actually or apparently different from that of its rival.426 The authors tell 
us that “[i]f firms in a particular group produce goods which are 
differentiated, the products of the different firms are imperfect 
substitutes for each other and . . . this gives each firm the potential” for 
monopoly profits.427 This is a result of the fact that “monopoly reduces 
the sensitivity to competitive moves that provide firms with the basic 
incentive to differentiate their product.”428 
In the general scheme of things, product differentiation occurs 
when competing goods act as imperfect substitutes for one another.429 
The argument is that “product differentiation encourages competition by 
making entry possible,”430 as “[t]rademarks, in turn, facilitate the 
differentiation that facilitates entry.”431 
According to Clarkson and Miller, the sources of product 
differentiation are generally grouped into the following four categories:  
1. Differences in quality or design 
 
 423. Product differentiation leads to a variety of products being produced. For discussions on 
the economic benefits of product differentiation, see, for example, Randall G. Holcombe, Product 
Differentiation and Economic Progress, 12 Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 17, 17, 26–27 (2009). 
 424. See Simon P. Anderson, Product Differentiation, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS 662, 662 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (footnote 
not in original). 
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 426. Id. at 4–6. 
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 428. Id. Earlier analysis of monopolistic competition provided a theory of product variety in a 
market economy, and this was well documented in EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF 
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2. Differences in consumer ignorance regarding essential 
characteristics and qualities of the goods purchased (for example, 
durable goods that are infrequently purchased and are complex in 
design)  
3. Brand names, trademarks, or company names derived from sales 
promotion activities of sellers, particularly advertising and service 
4. Differences in the location of sellers of similar goods.432 
Product differentiation becomes a grey area, with no signs of being 
bad or good, when it is integrated into law and economics and its 
antitrust implications. On one hand, consumers benefit from the wide 
variety of product offerings in order to satisfy their differing 
preferences.433 On the other hand, product differentiation can facilitate 
the potentially harmful exercise of market power, since “the producer of 
a differentiated product often enjoys a localized monopoly and may, in 
consequence, be able to charge a higher price than it otherwise 
could.”434 The grey area presented by product differentiation does not 
necessarily mean that there are no grave antitrust implications. Product 
differentiation may encourage price fixing among similar products when 
monetary transfers are absent.435 Price fixing or cartels, however, are 
still illegal under antitrust law, and would fall under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act or Article 102 of the TFEU.436 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This article has demonstrated (or attempted to demonstrate) that 
the distinctiveness requirement in trade mark registration is a core 
principle that paves the way for trade marks to become monopolies. 
This article has further argued that trade mark protection is a form of 
monopoly, given that the property rights in trade marks are “exclusive 
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and absolute.”437 Although laws regulate monopolies in order to protect 
the interest of the consumer,438 the behavioral patterns of consumers 
towards a product may enable the product to sustain its monopoly since 
only consumer demands increase the value of the product.439 
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